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Executive summary
In accordance with the east coast high speed rail (HSR) 
study terms of reference, AECOM and its sub-consultants 
(Grimshaw, KPMG, SKM, ACIL Tasman, Booz & Co and 
Hyder, hereafter referred to collectively as the Study Team) 
have prepared this report (Report). The Study Team has 
prepared this Report for the sole use of the Commonwealth 
Government: Department  of Infrastructure and Transport 
(Client) and for a specific purpose, each as expressly stated 
in the Report. No other party should rely on this Report 
or the information contain in it without the prior written 
consent of the Study Team.
The Study Team undertakes no duty, nor accepts any 
responsibility or liability, to any third party who may rely 
upon or use this Report. The Study Team has prepared 
this Report based on the Client’s description of its 
requirements, exercising the degree of skill, care and 
diligence expected of a consultant performing the same or 
similar services for the same or similar study, and having 
regard to assumptions that the Study Team can reasonably 
be expected to make in accordance with sound professional 
principles. The Study Team may also have relied upon 
information provided by the Client and other third parties 
to prepare this Report, some of which may not have been 
verified or checked for accuracy, adequacy or completeness. 
The Report must not be modified or adapted in any way 
and may be transmitted, reproduced or disseminated only 
in its entirety. Any third party that receives this Report, by 
their acceptance or use of it, releases the Study Team and 
its related entities from any liability for direct, indirect, 
consequential or special loss or damage whether arising in 
contract, warranty, express or implied, tort or otherwise, 
and irrespective of fault, negligence and strict liability.
The projections, estimation of capital and operational 
costs, assumptions, methodologies and other information 
in this Report have been developed by the Study Team 
from its independent research effort, general knowledge 
of the industry and consultations with various third 
parties (Information Providers) to produce the Report 
and arrive at its conclusions. The Study Team has not 
verified information provided by the Information Providers 
(unless specifically noted otherwise) and it assumes 
no responsibility nor makes any representations with 
respect to the adequacy, accuracy or completeness of such 
information. No responsibility is assumed for inaccuracies 
in reporting by Information Providers including, without 
limitation, inaccuracies in any other data source whether 
provided in writing or orally used in preparing or presenting 
the Report.
In addition, the Report is based upon information that was 
obtained on or before the date in which the Report was 
prepared. Circumstances and events may occur following 
the date on which such information was obtained that are 
beyond the Study Team’s control and which may affect the 
findings or projections contained in the Report, including 
but not limited to changes in ‘external’ factors such as 
changes in government policy; changes in law; fluctuations 
in market conditions, needs and behaviour; the pricing of 
carbon, fuel, products, materials, equipment, services and 
labour; financing options; alternate modes of transport 
or construction of other means of transport; population 
growth or decline; or changes in the Client’s needs and 
requirements affecting the development of the project. 
The Study Team may not be held responsible or liable for 
such circumstances or events and specifically disclaim any 
responsibility therefore.
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Overview
A strategic study on the implementation of a High Speed Rail 
(HSR) network (the study) on the east coast of Australia between 
Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne was announced by the Minister 
for Infrastructure and Transport, the Hon Anthony Albanese MP, 
in August 2010.
The study has been conducted in two phases. Phase 1, published 
in August 2011, identified a short-list of corridors and station 
options and estimated preliminary costs and demand for HSR 
on the east coast of Australia. Phase 2 built on phase 1, but was 
considerably broader and deeper in objectives and scope, and so 
refined many of the phase 1 estimates, particularly the demand 
and cost estimates. This phase 2 report presents detailed 
findings on the 12 advisory objectives established for the study.
Drawings and maps have been prepared for the purpose of 
depicting the recommended alignment for the HSR system and 
to enable civil construction cost estimates to be made.

Key
findings
     Key Findings
Definition of the preferred HSR system
The HSR network would comprise 
approximately 1,748 kilometres of dedicated 
route with four city centre stations, four 
city-peripheral stations (one in Brisbane, 
two in Sydney and one in Melbourne) and 12 
regional stations.
•	 HSR	would	require	a	dedicated	railway	
network	to	deliver	the	necessary	level	of	system	
performance,	in	terms	of	journey	time	and	
reliability,	to	be	competitive	with	other	modes	of	
transport,	particularly aviation.
To meet expected demand, the HSR system 
would offer a combination of services, 
including direct express services and limited 
stop services.
•	 Typical	express	journey	times	would	be	two	
hours	and	37	minutes	between	Brisbane	and	
Sydney,	one	hour	and	four	minutes	between	
Sydney	and	Canberra,	and	two	hours	and	
44 minutes	between	Sydney	and	Melbourne.
•	 The	HSR	would	operate	frequent	services	
between	capital	cities	and	regional	centres.
•	 In	2065,	it	is	forecast	that	peak	period	demand	
for	Sydney-Melbourne	would	be	met	by	two	
non-stop	inter-capital	express	services	per	hour	
per	direction	and	three	one-stop	inter-capital	
express	services	per	hour	per	direction,	calling	
at	either	Sydney	South	or	Melbourne	North	city	
peripheral	stations.
The dedicated HSR network would need to 
be integrated into the hubs of existing urban 
public transport systems and road networks 
to maximise its connectivity with other 
transport networks.
•	 All	city	centre	stations	must	be	integrated	with	
other	public	transport	networks	and	the	city-
peripheral	stations	must	have	good	access	to	
major	road	networks.
•	 Most	of	the	stations	on	the	network	would	
require	some	local	enhancements	to	public	
transport	services,	parking	and	interchange	
arrangements	to	ensure	good	connectivity.	
 
Cost of constructing the HSR system
The estimated cost of constructing the 
preferred HSR alignment in its entirety 
would be about $114 billion (in 2012 terms), 
comprising $64 billion between Brisbane 
and Sydney and $50 billion between Sydney, 
Canberra and Melbourne.
•	 The	preferred	HSR	alignment	has	been	designed	
first	and	foremost	to	meet	market needs	(in	terms	
of	journey	times	and	reliability),	while	also	being	
environmentally	and	economically sustainable.
•	 Tunnelling	has	been	adopted	where	no	
dedicated	surface	route	could	be	created	without	
unacceptable	dislocation	and/or		
environmental	costs.	Tunnels	make	up		
144	kilometres	(eight	per	cent)	of	the	preferred	
alignment	and	are	the	most	significant	
construction	cost	element	(29 per	cent	of	
total	construction	costs).	Access	to	and	from	
Sydney	would	require	the	most	tunnelling	
(67	kilometres)	compared	to	Brisbane	
(five kilometres),	Melbourne	(eight	kilometres)	
and	Canberra	(four	kilometres).	
•	 The	HSR	system	would	adopt	internationally	
proven	and	available	technology	for	train	sets	
and	associated	systems	(such	as	train	control	and	
power	supply	systems),	which	would	cost	less	
than	if	a	customised	design	were	required.	
 Forecast HSR demand
Between 46 million and 111 million passengers 
are forecast to use HSR services for inter-
city1 and regional trips2, if the preferred HSR 
network were fully operational in 2065, with a 
central forecast of 83.6 million passengers  
per year.
•	 By	2065,	HSR	could	attract	40	per	cent	of	inter-
city	air	travel	on	the	east	coast	and	60	per	cent	
of	regional	air	travel	(primarily	long	regional).	
On	the	three	main	sectors,	Sydney-Melbourne,	
Sydney-Brisbane	and	Sydney-Canberra,	HSR	
could	attract	more	than	50	per	cent	of	the	air	
travel	market.
•	 Actual	passenger	numbers	would	depend	on	
the	rates	of	population	and	economic	growth,	
the	levels	of	congestion	at	airports,	including	
travelling	to	and	from	airports,	and	the	
fares charged.	
•	 Sydney-Melbourne	is	expected	to	be	the	
largest	market	for	HSR,	with	about	19	million	
passenger	trips	per	year	forecast.	This	is	
considerably	more	than	the	next	largest	market,	
Brisbane-Sydney,	with	nearly		
11	million	passenger	trips	per	year,	and	almost	
four	times	as	many	as	the	Sydney-Canberra	
market,	with	about	five	million	passenger	trips	
per	year.
•	 Inter-city and	long	regional	travel	(>250	km)	
are	expected	to	account	for	49	per	cent	and	
approximately	36 per	cent	of	total	passenger	
trips	and 62	per	cent	and	35	per	cent	of	total	
passenger	kilometres	travelled	respectively.	Short	
regional	travel	(<250	km)	would	represent	14 per	
cent	of	total	trips,	and	only	a	small	per	cent	of	
total	passenger	kilometres	travelled.	Business	
travellers	would	account	for	about	35	per	cent	
of	total	trips	and	42	per	cent	of	total	passenger	
kilometres	on	the	entire	HSR	system.	
•	 For	the	purpose	of	assessing	demand,	average	
fares	for	business	and	leisure	travel	were	set	
to	be	comparable	to,	and	competitive	with,	
air	fare	rates	on	the	main	inter-capital	routes	
on	the	east	coast.	In	practice,	a	range	of	fares	
would	be	offered,	targeted	to	market	segments	
and	influenced	by	seat	utilisation	patterns	and	
competitive	pressures,	as	is	currently	the	case	
with	the	airlines.	
Staging the development of HSR
The optimal staging for the HSR program 
would involve building the Sydney-
Melbourne line first, starting with the 
Sydney-Canberra sector. Subsequent stages 
would be Canberra-Melbourne, Newcastle-
Sydney, Brisbane-Gold Coast and Gold 
Coast-Newcastle.
•	 International	experience	of	large	infrastructure	
developments	shows	that	approximately		
ten	years	could	be	required	for	planning,	
consultation	and	environmental	approvals,		
and	five	years	for	preconstruction	and	
procurement	activities.	
1	 The	inter-city	market	is	defined	as	journeys	over	600	kilometres	between	the	six	main	towns	and	cities	in	the	corridor	based	on	
population	–	Brisbane,	Gold	Coast,	Newcastle,	Sydney,	Canberra	and	Melbourne.	
2	 The	regional	market	has	been	broken	into	long	regional	trips	greater	than	250	kilometres,	which	includes	Sydney-Canberra,	and	
short	regional	trips	less	than	250	kilometres,	which	includes	Brisbane-Gold	Coast	and	Newcastle-Sydney.
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Table	1	 Commencement	and	operational	milestones	for	optimal	staging
Stage Main construction commences
Operations  
commence
Sydney-Melbourne line
Sydney-Canberra 2027 2035
Canberra-Melbourne 2032 2040
Brisbane-Sydney line
Newcastle-Sydney 2037 2045
Brisbane-Gold	Coast 2043 2051
Gold	Coast-Newcastle 2048 2058
•	 Some	preliminary	(‘enabling’)	works	to	enable	
construction	of	the	HSR	at	Sydney	Central	
station	(e.g.	moving	platforms	and	utilities)	
would	be	undertaken	before	2027.
•	 Construction	of	the	whole	HSR	system	would	
take	around	30	years.	
•	 The	Sydney-Melbourne	line	has	stronger	forecast	
demand	than	the	Brisbane-Sydney	line,	would	
be	less	expensive	to	build	and	is	predicted	to	have	
higher	economic	and	financial	returns.	It	should	
therefore	be	completed	first.	
•	 The	preferred	staging	of	construction	for	the	
Brisbane-Sydney	line	(Newcastle-Sydney,	
Brisbane-Gold	Coast	and	then	Gold	Coast-
Newcastle)	reflects	both	market	demand	and	
economic	characteristics.
•	 For	the	purpose	of	evaluation,	the	study	assumed	
the	initial	stage	between	Sydney	and	Canberra	
would	operate	from	2035,	with	the	Sydney-
Melbourne	line	operational	from	2040.	
Table	2	 Commencement	and	operational	milestones	for	accelerated	staging
Main construction Operations  Stage commences commence
Sydney-Melbourne line
Sydney-Canberra 2022	(earliest	possible	start) 2030
Canberra-Melbourne 2027 2035
Brisbane-Sydney line
Newcastle-Sydney 2032 2040
Brisbane-Gold	Coast 2038 2046
Gold	Coast-Newcastle 2043 2053
•	 Brisbane-Gold	Coast	would	be	completed	
in 2051.
•	 Gold	Coast-Newcastle	would	be	the	last	stage	to
be	built,	with	the	complete	Brisbane-Melbourne
line	operational	by	2058.
It is possible the program could be 
accelerated, with the Sydney-Melbourne 
line operational by 2035. In this case the 
Sydney-Canberra stage could be operational 
by 2030. 
•	 Assuming	funding,	financing	and	all	relevant	
approvals	were	in	place	and	preliminary	design	
had	been	completed,	the	earliest	that	main	
construction	work	could	reasonably	start	would	
be	2022.	
•	 Bringing	the	program	forward	would	reduce	the
economic	benefits,	primarily	because	the	market	
volumes	would	be	lower	when	operations	began.	
 Financial assessment
The HSR program and the majority of  
its individual stages are expected to 
produce only a small positive financial  
return on investment.
•	 The	distribution	of	the	economic	benefits	of	
HSR	between	users	of	the	system	and	the	
operator(s)	would	depend	on	the	prices charged.
•	 Based	on	charging	competitive	fares,	the	HSR	
operations	and	ancillary	services	(such	as	car	
parking	and	lease	revenues	from	related	property	
development)	would	not	deliver	sufficient	
revenue	to	fund	or	recover	the	expected	capital	
costs	of	the	HSR	program.
Governments would be required to fund the 
majority of the upfront capital costs. 
•	 The	potential	to	attract	private	finance	is	limited.	
An	expected	return	of	at	least	15	per	cent	would	
be	required	at	this	stage	of	project	development	
to	be	attractive	to	commercial	providers	of	debt	
and	equity	to	major	infrastructure	projects.	HSR	
would	fall	well	short	of	this.	
•	 The	estimated	real	financial	internal	rate	of	
return	(FIRR)	is	1.0	per	cent	for	Sydney-
Melbourne	and	0.8	per	cent	for	the		
whole	network.	
•	 If	potential	commercial	funding	were	maximised,	
a	funding	gap	in	the	order	of		$98	billion,	or	
86 per	cent	of	the	up-front	capital	cost	of	the	HSR	
program,	would	remain.
If HSR passenger projections were met 
at the fare levels proposed, the HSR 
system, once operational, could generate 
sufficient fare revenue and other revenue 
to meet operating costs without ongoing 
public subsidy. 
•	 Post	construction,	the	HSR	program	as	a	whole,	
and	each	of	its	sectors	(with	the	exception	of	
Sydney-Canberra	as	a	stand-alone	sector)	are	
expected	to	generate	sufficient	operating	income	
to	cover	their	ongoing	operational	and	asset	
renewal	costs.
HSR fares adopted for the study have been 
assumed to be comparable to air fares on the 
inter-capital routes, and it would appear HSR 
could sustain higher fares.
•	 Increasing	the	cost	of	fares	would	increase	the	
financial	returns	and	reduce	the	funding	gap,	
although	doing	so	would	reduce	the	number	of	
people	using	the	system.	Even	so,	the	economic	
benefits	of	the	program	would	remain	positive.
•	 Given	that	airfares	in	Australia	are	already	
highly	competitive	on	major	routes,	it	is	not	
expected	that	airlines	would	respond	to	HSR	
competition	by	reducing	fares	on	a	sustained	
basis.	It	has	been	assumed,	in	line	with	
international	experience,	that	airlines	would	
quickly	reduce	capacity,	either	by	reducing	
frequencies	or	aircraft	sizes,	to	locations	within	
the	HSR	corridor	where	there	is	significant	
passenger	diversion	to	HSR.	It	is	likely	that	any	
reduction	in	capacity	would	be	redeployed	to	
routes	outside	the	HSR	corridor.	
•	 Nevertheless,	to	the	extent	that	airlines	are	
able	to	innovate	in	ways	that	have	not	been	
anticipated	in	this	study,	there	would	be	an	
impact	on	HSR	patronage	and	capacity	to		
meet	operating	costs.	The	sensitivity	tests	
included	one	scenario	in	which	airfares	were	
reduced	by	50	per	cent	for	two	years.
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Economic assessment
Investment in a future HSR program could 
deliver positive net economic benefits.
•	 The	Sydney-Melbourne	line	would	deliver	a	
slightly	higher	economic	internal	rate	of	return	
(EIRR)	on	investment	than	the	whole	network	
would.	The	EIRR	of	Sydney-Melbourne	is	
estimated	at	7.8	per	cent,	compared	to	7.6 per	
cent	for	an	investment	in	the	staged	HSR	
program	as	a	whole.	
•	 The	economic	benefit	cost	ratio	(EBCR)	
calculates	the	ratio	of	the	present	value	of	
benefits	to	the	present	value	of	costs.	When	
calculated	using	a	discount	rate	of	four	per	cent,	
the	ECBR	is	2.5	for	Sydney-Melbourne	and	2.3	
for	the	whole	network.	
•	 The	economic	net	present	value	(ENPV)	of	
costs	and	benefits	associated	with	a	program	
of	investment	in	the	preferred	HSR	system	
would	be	$70	billion	for	Sydney-Melbourne	
and	$101 billion	for	the	network	as	a	whole,	
calculated	using	a	discount	rate	of	four	per	cent	
a	year	until	the	start	of	construction	in	2027	
(financial	year	2028),	and	expressed	in $2012.
•	 The	economic	results	remain	positive	under	a	
range	of	changed	assumptions.	When	calculated	
using	a	seven	per	cent	discount	rate,	which	
represents	a	higher	hurdle	rate	for	judging	
economic	performance,	the	EBCR	would	be	1.1	
and	the	ENPV	would	be	$5 billion.	
•	 Most	of	the	economic	benefits	(90	per	cent)	
would	accrue	to	the	users	of	the	HSR	system.	
About	two-thirds	of	the	user	benefits	are	
attributable	to	business	users	travelling	long	
distances,	which	reflects	in	part	the	relatively	
higher	value	of	time	attributed	to	business	
travellers	compared	to	leisure	travellers.	
•	 Externalities	would	be	relatively	minor,	
accounting	for	only	about	three	per	cent	of	
the benefits.	
Environmental and social assessment
The preferred HSR alignment has been 
selected to avoid major environmental and 
social impacts. The residual impacts on 
natural environments and heritage can be 
managed by appropriate mitigation and, 
where necessary, offsets.
•	 Potential	significant	impacts	in	urban	areas,	such	
as	noise	and	large	scale	property	acquisition,	have	
largely	been	avoided	by	the	use	of	tunnelling	on	
the	approaches	to	capital cities.	
 Broader impacts of HSR
Aligning public policies, programs and 
capabilities across Australian Government, 
state/territory government and local 
government agencies as part of a corridor 
regional development concept would be 
necessary to realise the full benefits of HSR.
•	 The	implementation	of	HSR	would	substantially	
improve	accessibility	for	the	regional	centres	that	
it	serves,	providing	the	opportunity	for	–	but	not	
the	automatic	realisation	of		–	increased	regional	
economic	development.	The	ability	of	these	
centres	to	take	advantage	of	the	opportunities	
created	by	improved	accessibility	would	require	
coordinated	and	complementary	policies	to		
be	implemented.	
•	 Emerging	international	evidence	suggests	that	
wider	economic	benefits	may	be	generated	by	
regional	accessibility	improvements,	but	the	
quantitative	estimates	are	neither	sufficiently	
certain	nor	robust	for	inclusion	in	the	main	
economic	assessment.
 
Implementing a future HSR program
Both the public and private sectors would 
play a significant role in the planning and 
implementation of a future HSR system.
•	 Governments	would	need	to	have	a	central	
role	in	the	planning	and	development	of	the	
HSR	system,	including	securing	the	necessary	
approvals.	The	primary	public	sector	roles	
would	be	executed	through	a	single	HSR	
development authority.
•	 As	HSR	would	be	predominantly	publicly	
funded,	the	Australian,	ACT	and	relevant	
state	governments	would	be	the	owners	of	
the	system	and	would	assume	the	key	role	in	
the	specification	and	procurement	of	network	
infrastructure,	the	allocation	of	its	capacity	
for	transport	services	and	the	specification	of	
minimum	service	requirements.	
•	 The	private	sector	would	be	responsible	for	
building	the	HSR	infrastructure	under	contract	
to	the	HSR	development	authority,	and	for	the	
delivery	of	train	services	to	the	public.	Control	
of	the	movement	of	trains	and	maintenance	
of	infrastructure	would	also	be	the	role	of	the	
private	sector,	under	competitively	tendered	
concession arrangements.
The key risks to the HSR program and 
its successful performance are common 
to all major greenfield infrastructure 
projects; most notably, a lack of certainty 
about future demand and revenues, 
and the potential for cost over-runs 
during construction.
•	 Allowance	for	risk	and	uncertainty	has	been	
included	in	the	demand,	economic	and	financial	
assessments,	but	the	risks	cannot	be	perfectly	
controlled	and	a	program	of	this	nature,	
particularly	extending	over	a	long	period	of	time,	
contains	significant uncertainties.
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Key public policy issues for a decision to proceed
Whether to proceed with planning for a 
future HSR program must necessarily be 
a policy decision, taking account of many 
factors that cannot be known with certainty, 
and in the context of risks which cannot be 
perfectly controlled. 
•	 This	study	estimates	that	HSR	would	
have	positive	net	economic	benefits,	using	
the	Australian	Transport	Council’s	cost-
benefit	methodology	guidelines,	which	are	
conventionally	applied	to	major	transport	
infrastructure	projects.	However,	this	appraisal	
extends	to	2085,	a	necessarily	distant	time	
horizon	for	program	delivery	and	market		
impact	compared	to	most	infrastructure	
feasibility	studies.
•	 The	long-term	future	is	inherently	uncertain	and	
requires	caution	when	making	a	judgement,	but	
it	is	most	likely	that	demographic	and	economic	
trends	will	support	a	steadily	improving	case	for	
HSR	on	the	east	coast	rather	than	otherwise.	
In	that	case,	policy-makers,	whether	or	not	
yet	convinced	of	the	merits	of	committing	to	
HSR,	may	also	legitimately	weigh	the	possible	
consequences	of	not	taking	actions	to	preserve	
that	option	at	some	time	in	the	future.	
•	 In	this	regard,	inaction	is	not	benign.	In		
the	absence	of	a	protected	route,	the	spread	
of	cities	and	other	developments	in	the	
preferred	corridor	will	gradually	reduce	the	
constructability	and	increase	the	potential	capital	
costs	of	a	future	HSR	program,	rendering	it	
increasingly	more	difficult	to	implement,	even	
while	the	fundamental	trends	may	become	
increasingly	favourable.	
As in all publicly-funded infrastructure 
projects, the balance between public benefit 
and public cost should be considered. 
•	 The	positive	economic	performance	that	is	
estimated	to	be	achievable	from	an	investment	in	
HSR,	most	of	which	would	directly	benefit	the	
users	of	the	system,	contrasts	with	low	financial	
returns,	which	would	need	to	be	supported	by	
public	funding.	Although	this	is	true	of	many	
transport	infrastructure	projects,	including	
national	highways,	it	is	an	issue	that	must		
be	confronted.	
•	 The	external	benefits	of	HSR	-	fewer	road	
accidents,	reduced	road	congestion	and	so	on	–	
which	might	contribute	to	its	rationale,	would	be	
positive	but	are	estimated	to	fall	far	short	of	the	
public	funding	required.	
•	 By	contrast,	the	opportunities	for	urban	and	
regional	development	in	the	HSR	corridor	
will	be	considered	by	many	people	in	Australia	
to	have	a	high	potential	value	in	public	
policy	terms,	but	those	benefits	do	not	follow	
automatically	or	with	certainty.	There	would	
need	to	be	confidence	that	they	would	be	actively	
exploited	and	realised	to	justify	any	great	weight	
in	the	decision	on	whether	to	proceed.	That	in	
turn	would	require	policy	commitment	at	all	
levels	of	government	to	pursuing	an	integrated	
corridor	development	strategy,	synchronised	
with	the	delivery	of	the	HSR	program.
A related policy issue is the extent to which 
the initial capital costs of an HSR program 
should be recovered from users. 
•	 Taxpayers	would	need	to	make	a	substantial	
contribution	to	the	up-front	costs	of	establishing	
an	HSR	system.	The	analysis	suggests	that	
charging	higher	fares	than	those	assumed	would	
be	feasible,	and	would	improve	financial	returns,	
but	would	reduce	overall	economic	benefits	as	
fewer	people	would	use	the	system.	
•	 While	economic	principles	suggest	that	the	
community’s	economic	welfare	is	best	pursued	
by	charging	users	only	the	marginal	cost	of	
infrastructure,	establishing	the	balance	between	
recovery	of	public	investment	in	infrastructure	
and	maximising	its	economic	benefits	is	
ultimately	a	policy	matter.	
•	 If	an	HSR	program	were	adopted,	there	would	
need	to	be	an	up-front	understanding	of	what	
principles	would	be	applied	to	infrastructure	
pricing	and	cost	recovery.	Certainly,	if	passenger	
numbers	were	to	grow	over	time,	governments	
would	be	in	a	position	to	begin	to	recover	some	
proportion	of	its	capital	investment.
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The expected growth in 
travel demand
Population	and	employment	growth	will	continue	
to	challenge	the	capacity	of	existing	transport	
networks	and	public	infrastructure	along	the	
east	coast	of	Australia1.	Travel	on	the	east	coast	
of	Australia	is	forecast	to	grow	at	around	1.8	per	
cent	per	year	over	the	next	20	years,	increasing	by	
approximately	60	per	cent	by	2035.	By	2065,	travel	
on	the	east	coast	will	have	more	than	doubled,	
from	152	million	trips	in	2009	to	355	million	trips	
per	year2.
Without	HSR,	aviation	would	remain	the	primary	
means	of	transport	for	long	distance	interstate		
(and	some	inter-regional)	trips	and	road-based	
travel	by	private	vehicle	would	remain	the	primary	
mode	for	connections	with,	and	between,	regional	
centres.	Together	these	would	carry	over	90	per	
cent	of	the	trips	on	the	east	coast,	subject	to	
capacity	being	available.
This	strategic	study	investigates	how	HSR	can	play	
an	effective	role	in	meeting	future	travel	demand	
by	providing	an	alternative	mode	of	transport	that	
would	be	attractive	for	people	to	use.	
1	 Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics	(ABS)	mid-range	population	projections	estimate	that	between	2011	and	2050,	the	population	will	
grow	by	37	per	cent	in	NSW,	49	per	cent	in	Victoria	and	80	per	cent	in	Queensland.	ABS,	Population	Projections	Australia	2006	to	
2101,	catalogue	no.	3222.0.
2	 See	Chapter 2	for	detail	of	how	these	forecasts	were	determined.
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What is HSR?
HSR	is	generally	defined	as	a	purpose-built,	
fixed-track	mode	of	transport,	capable	of	moving	
people	at	speeds	of	at	least	250	kilometres	per	
hour,	usually	over	long	distances.	Internationally,	
it	typically	offers	services	between	major	cities,	
competing	in	the	same	travel	market	as	aviation,	
but	also	provides	opportunities	for	intermediate	
stops	in	regional	areas	and	fast	commuter	rail	
services	from	outer	metropolitan	areas.	HSR	
stations	are	typically	located	within	city	centres,	
close	to	population	and	business	centres.	
Originating	in	Japan	in	the	1960s,	HSR	systems	
now	operate	in	14	countries3.	Total	global	
kilometres	of	track	have	increased	from	just	over	
1,000	kilometres	in	1980,	to	15,000	kilometres	
in	20114.	China	is	currently	constructing	an	
additional	10,000	kilometres	of	HSR	network5.	
Most	HSR	systems	operate	on	dedicated	tracks	
at	a	maximum	speed	of	between	250	and	300	
kilometres	per	hour,	with	some	systems	now	
operating	in	excess	of	300	kilometres	per	
hour6.	Some	HSR	services	also	use	sections	of	
conventional	tracks	at	lower	speeds,	either	on	entry	
to	cities	or	to	extend	beyond	a	dedicated	line7.	All	
current	HSR	systems	use	conventional	steel	wheels	
on	rails	and	are	powered	by	electric	traction,	
although	there	are	several	variants	in	terms	of	
rolling	stock	and	infrastructure.	
Definition of the preferred 
HSR system
HSR alignment and station locations
The	preferred	HSR	route	on	the	east	coast	of	
Australia	has	been	developed	first	and	foremost	to	
meet	market	needs	(in	terms	of	journey	times	and	
reliability),	while	also	being	environmentally	and	
economically	sustainable.	The	route,	illustrated	in	
Figure ES-1,	broadly	follows	a	coastal	alignment	
between	Brisbane	and	Sydney	followed	by	an	
inland	alignment	from	Sydney	to	Melbourne,	with	
spur	lines	to	the	Gold	Coast	and	Canberra.
City	centre	stations	would	be	terminal	stations	
within	the	CBDs	of	the	capital	cities.	These	
locations	are	the	single	most	important	origin	
and	destination	in	each	city	and	provide	ready	
access	to,	and	integrate	with,	other	metropolitan	
transport	services.	CBD	stations	would	be	located	
beneath	the	Brisbane	Transit	Centre	in	Brisbane	
and	on	the	eastern	fringe	of	Civic	in	Canberra,	
and	would	share	existing	stations	at	Central	in	
Sydney	and	Southern	Cross	in	Melbourne.	Each	
of	the	three	main	capital	cities	(Sydney,	Melbourne	
and	Brisbane)	would	also	have	a	peripheral	station	
(in	Sydney’s	case	it	would	have	two	–	one	to	the	
north	and	one	to	the	south	of	the	urban	area),	for	
passengers	who	would	find	it	more	convenient	to	
access	HSR	without	having	to	travel	into	or	out	of	
the	CBD.	
The	minimum	corridor	width	required	to	
accommodate	two	dedicated	HSR	tracks	is		
30	metres.	This	represents	a	refinement	of	
the	phase	1	evaluation,	which	was	based	on	a	
200 metre	width	to	ensure	that	any	significant	
issues	were	captured	when	comparing	initial	
corridor	options.	The	30	metre	width	does	
not	include	the	additional	width	required	for	
embankments	or	cuttings	necessary	to	maintain	
the	smooth	vertical	alignment	required	for	HSR.	
In	many	developed	urban	areas,	surface	alignments	
would	not	permit	competitive	access	times	to	
the	city	centres	for	HSR	services	without	major	
dislocation	of	the	urban	population	and,	in	such	
cases,	the	alignment	would	be	placed	in	tunnel.	
Sections	of	the	regional	alignment	would	also	
be	built	in	tunnel	or	on	viaducts	to	avoid	built-
up	or	environmentally	sensitive	areas.	Although	
tunnels	add	to	the	capital	cost,	they	would	allow	
the	infrastructure	to	be	delivered	in	a	way	that	
minimises	any	potential	negative	impacts	on	the	
community	and	environment	during	construction	
and	operation,	and	minimises	delays	and	
difficulties	during	construction.	
3	 Japan,	Italy,	France,	Germany,	Spain,	Switzerland,	Belgium,	Netherlands,	Luxembourg,	China,	United	Kingdom,	Korea,	Taiwan	
and	Turkey.
4	 Derived	from	The	World	Bank,	High speed rail: the fast track to economic development?,	2010	(updated).
5	 Zhang	Jianping,	Planning and Development of High Speed Rail Network in China,	UIC	8th	World	Congress	on	High	Speed		
Rail,	2012.
6	 For	example,	both	France	and	Spain	operate	services	with	speeds	of	over	300	kilometres	per	hour	in	commercial	service.
7	 Particularly	in	France	and	Germany	and,	to	a	limited	extent,	in	Japan	and	China.
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Regional	stations	were	selected	on	the	basis	of	
potential	patronage	and	have	been	proposed	at	
the	Gold	Coast,	Casino,	Grafton,	Coffs	Harbour,	
Port	Macquarie,	Taree,	Newcastle,	Central	Coast,	
Southern	Highlands,	Wagga	Wagga,	Albury-
Wodonga	and	Shepparton.	To	minimise	cost	and	
avoid	disruption	to	built-up	areas,	these	stations	
would	be	located	outside	the	current	urban	areas,	
although	they	would	typically	be	within	ten	to		
20	kilometres	of	the	town	centre	and	would	
have	both	car	parking	facilities	and	facilities	to	
interchange	with	local	public	transport	services.	
Figure	ES-1	 Preferred	HSR	alignment	and	stations	for	the	east	coast	of	Australia
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Types of HSR services
The	market	assessment	showed	strong	demand	on	
the	east	coast,	now	and	into	the	future,	for	high	
speed	travel	between	the	capital	cities	and	to	and	
from	regional	centres.	The	preferred	HSR	system	
would	therefore	offer	two	types	of	services:
•	 Inter-capital	express	services,	mostly	operating	
non-stop	between	the	capital	city	central	
stations	but	with	some	also	stopping	at	the	city	
peripheral	stations.
•	 Inter-capital	regional	services	offering	high	
speed	services	between	the	capital	cities	and	
major	regional	centres.	Regional	services	would	
also	facilitate	travel	between	regional	stations,	
although	some	inter-regional	movements	with	
low	demand	may	require	passengers	to	change	
from	one	service	to	another	at	an	intermediate	
station	to	complete	their	journey.	
If	built,	the	system	would	also	have	the	capacity	to	
accommodate	fast	commuter	rail	services	between	
the	capital	cities	and	their	nearer	regional	centres	
(such	as	the	Central	Coast	and	Newcastle	in	
NSW),	many	of	which	currently	have	relatively	
slow,	if	any,	services.	Commuter	services	would	
probably	be	operated	by	third	parties.	They	have	
been	allowed	for	in	the	physical	planning	but	they	
would	not	positively	contribute	to	the	financial	
performance	of	HSR,	nor	would	they	be	the	source	
of	any	significant	incremental	economic	benefit	
in	the	cost-benefit	analysis	of	HSR.	Commuter	
demand	was	therefore	excluded	from	the	economic	
and	financial	appraisals.	
HSR service characteristics
Australian	market	research	and	international	
experience	have	indicated	that	HSR	would	need	
to	offer	competitive	door-to-door	journey	times,	
high	standards	of	comfort	and	convenience	and	a	
competitive	fare	structure	to	successfully	compete	
with	other	modes	of	transport,	especially	air.		
HSR	could	deliver	non-stop	journey	times	under	
three	hours	city	centre	to	city	centre,	between	
Brisbane	and	Sydney	and	Sydney	and	Melbourne,	
as	shown	in	Figure ES-2	and	Table ES-1	and	
Table ES-2.	
Figure	ES-2	 HSR	travel	times	between	major	cities
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Table	ES-1	 Typical	HSR	travel	times	and	distances	between	selected	stations	on	Brisbane-Sydney	line	
ig
in
O
r
 Destination
Coffs Central Newcastle SydneyHarbour Coast
Regional Regional Regional	 Express Regional	
1hr	11min*	 2hr	28min	 2hr	43min	 2hr	37min	 3hr	09min	
Brisbane
(332km) (662km) (714km) (797km) (797km)
1hr	09min	 1hr	30min	 1hr	50min	
Coffs Harbour -
(330km) (382km) (465km)
0hr	14min	 0hr	39min	
Newcastle -
(52km) (134km)
0hr	27min	
Central Coast -
(83km)
*With	one	stop.	One	hour	23	minutes	with	three	stops.	
Note:	Distances	may	not	add	due	to	rounding.
Table	ES-2	 Typical	HSR	travel	times	and	distances	between	selected	stations	on	Sydney-Melbourne	line	
O
ri
g
in
Destination
Southern Albury-Canberra MelbourneHighlands Wodonga
Regional Express Regional	 Regional	 Express Regional
0hr	29min	 1hr	04min	 1h	11min	 1hr	55min	 2hr	44min	 3hr	03min	
Sydney
(98km) (280km) (280km) (540km) (824km) (824km)
Southern 0hr	39min	 1h	31min*	 2hr	29min	- -Highlands (183km) (442km) (727km)
1hr	16min	 2hr	10min	 2hr	28min	
Canberra
(366km) (651km) (651km)
Albury- 1hr	09min	-Wodonga (284km)
*Plus	interchange	time	at	Wagga	Wagga.	
Note:	Distances	may	not	add	due	to	rounding.
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Services	would	typically	operate	18	hours	per	day	
for	365	days	per	year.	Service	frequencies	would	
typically	be	at	least	hourly,	increasing	as	demand	
grew	to	reach	peak	period	service	frequencies	in	
2065,	as	shown	in	Table ES-3.	
Ultimately,	train	frequencies	would	be	influenced	
by	future	market	needs	and	the	preferred	train	
operating	strategy	(operating	speeds	and	stopping	
patterns)	but	the	indicative	frequencies	established	
for	this	study	are	compatible	with	the	forecast	
demand	and	efficient	train	utilisation.
Table	ES-3	 Peak	service	frequencies	in	2065	(per	hour	in	each	direction)
Route Inter-capital express Inter-capital regional 
Brisbane-Sydney
Gold Coast-Sydney
Sydney-Canberra
Sydney-Melbourne
Canberra-Melbourne
3-4 2
- 4
1 2
5 2
1 1
Fares	would	be	structured	to	be	competitive	with	
alternative	modes	of	transport.	For	the	purposes	
of	the	main	demand	assessment,	average	fares	
for	business	and	leisure	travel	were	designed	to	
be	comparable	to,	and	competitive	with,	air	fares	
on	the	main	inter-capital	routes	on	the	east	coast,	
taking	into	account	the	types	of	fares	typically	
purchased	by	the	different	types	of	passenger8.	
In	practice,	a	range	of	fares	would	be	offered,	
targeted	to	market	segments	and	influenced	by	seat	
utilisation	patterns	and	competitive	pressures,	as	is	
currently	the	case	with	the	airlines.	
Forecast HSR demand 
An	HSR	system	would	significantly	increase	
long	and	medium-distance	transport	capacity	on	
the	east	coast	of	Australia	and	would	provide	an	
alternative	mode	of	transport	that,	according	to	
market	research	and	supported	by	international	
evidence,	would	be	attractive	to	many	travellers.	If	
the	complete	HSR	network	was	fully	operational,	
the	study	predicts	that,	under	the	reference	case	
assumptions9,	it	could	attract	approximately	
83.6 million	passenger	trips	by	2065,	as	shown	
in	Table ES-4.	Figure ES-3	illustrates	the	main	
inter-city	passenger	trip	flows.
8	 	For	example,	the	average	HSR	single	fares	assumed	in	the	reference	case	between	Sydney	and	Melbourne	were	$141	for	the	average	
business	passenger	and	$86	for	the	average	leisure	passenger	but	sensitivity	tests	also	considered	fares	up	to	30	per	cent	and	50	per	
cent	greater.	The	corresponding	average	fares	paid	by	air	passengers	were	estimated	as	$137	and	$69	respectively.
9	 The	reference	case	is	part	of	the	central	case	established	for	evaluation.
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Figure	ES-3	 HSR	travel	demand	in	2065	between	major	cities	–	passenger	trips
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Table	ES-4	 HSR	travel	market	for	2065	
Total travel market (inter-city and regional)
Trips without HSR (million) 355
Trips with HSR (million)* 389
HSR travel market (inter-city and regional)
HSR trips (million) 83.6
HSR passenger kilometres (billion) 53.1
*Includes	new	demand	induced	by	the	construction	of	HSR.	Assumes	the	full	system	is	operational.
A	set	of	alternative	assumptions	produced	forecasts	
for	HSR	in	2065,	assuming	a	full	system	were	
to	be	operational,	of	between	46	million	and	
111	million	passenger	trips.	The	alternative	
assumptions	included	variations	in	population	and	
economic	growth,	increases	in	airport	capacity	at	
Sydney	(and	hence	improvements	in	the	aviation	
level	of	service)	and	variations	in	HSR	fares	relative	
to	the	projected	air	fares	and	car	running	costs.
Forecast	HSR	travel	demand	by	journey	type	in	
the	reference	case	is	presented	in	Figure ES-4	(for	
passenger	trips)	and	Figure ES-5	(for	passenger	
kilometres).	Travel	for	business	accounts	for	35	per	
cent	of	forecast	HSR	patronage,	with	inter-city	
business	travel	being	the	most	important10.	Inter-
city	travel	would	make	up	about	49	per	cent	of	
total	passenger	trips	and	62	per	cent	of	passenger	
kilometres.	Regional	travel	would	represent	about	
50	per	cent	of	total	passenger	trips	and	38	per	cent	
of	passenger	kilometres.	
10	 Inter-city	trips	are	defined	as	journeys	over	600	kilometres	between	the	six	main	towns	and	cities	in	the	corridor	based	on	population	
(Brisbane,	Gold	Coast,	Newcastle,	Sydney,	Canberra	and	Melbourne).	Regional	trips	have	been	broken	into	long	regional	trips	of	
greater	than	250	kilometres,	which	includes	Sydney-Canberra,	and	short	regional	trips	of	less	than	250	kilometres,	which	includes	
Brisbane-Gold	Coast	and	Newcastle-Sydney.
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Figure	ES-4	 HSR	travel	demand	in	2065	by	journey	type	(assuming	the	full	HSR	network	was	operational)	–	passenger	trips
Figure ES-4 
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Note:	Total	does	not	add	to	100%	due	to	rounding.
Figure	ES-5	 HSR	travel	demand	in	2065	by	journey	type	(assuming	the	full	HSR	network	was	operational)	–	passenger	kilometres
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Table ES-5	shows	the	forecast	travel	matrix	
for	the	reference	case	in	2065	when	the	full	
network	would	be	operational.	Intermediate	
stations	between	capital	centres	are	aggregated	
for	presentation	purposes.	Excluding	commuter	
markets,	Sydney-Melbourne	is	the	largest	market	
segment	for	HSR	with	about	19 million	passenger	
trips,	considerably	more	than	the	next	largest,	
Brisbane-Sydney,	with	nearly	11 million	passenger	
trips	and	almost	four	times	Sydney-Canberra,	with	
about	five	million	passenger	trips.	
Some	travel	was	omitted	from	the	matrix	because	
it	covered	only	a	short	distance,	or	would	be	best	
served	by	car,	implying	that	few	such	journeys	
would	be	likely	to	transfer	to	HSR.	This	included	
all	travel	wholly	within	each	of	the	intermediate	
areas,	other	than	that	to	and	from	Wollongong.	A	
small	proportion	of	the	omitted	longer	trips	could	
use	HSR,	and	to	this	extent,	the	HSR	forecasts	
are	conservative.	Trips	to	and	from	places	external	
to	the	study	area	were	also	excluded.	The	excluded	
trips	referred	to	above	are	shown	by	an	X	in		
the	table.
About	half	of	the	HSR	demand	would	be		
diverted	from	forecast	air	travel	as	shown	in		
Figure ES-6.	About	19	per	cent	of	total	
trips	would	be	new	demand	generated	by	the	
introduction	of	an	HSR	service	(shown	as		
induced	demand).	
Table	ES-5	 HSR	travel	market	matrix	for	2065	(‘000	trips	in	both	directions	per	year)
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X 2,210 1,650 750 600 10,860 1,240 1,130 730 2,490
  X 900 520 580 3,830 610 190 440 340
    X 810 X 5,500 190 330 X 850
      X 170 1,760 220 250 150 330
        X 2,990 20 300 X 730
          X 2,690 5,190 2,290 18,760
            80 480 100 2,320
              X 640 2,720
                X 4,660
                  X
83,600*
*Cells	may	not	exactly	sum	to	the	total	due	to	rounding.
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Figure	ES-6	 Source	of	HSR	travel	demand	in	2065	by	journey	type	(passenger	trips)	
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Figure  ES-6
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How	the	total	HSR	and	air	market	would	be	
shared	between	the	two	modes	of	transport	is	a	
key	issue	in	the	demand	assessment.	Considerable	
evidence	has	been	assembled	in	the	international	
literature	on	the	impacts	of	HSR	on	inter-capital	
air	travel	in	Europe	and	East	Asia.	In	Figure 
ES-7,	the	international	markets	are	represented	by	
the	blue	dots,	which	show	the	proportion	of	the	
combined	air	and	HSR	travel	market	captured	by	
HSR	on	selected	routes.	For	HSR	journey	times	
of	less	than	two	hours,	this	is	typically	over	80	per	
cent,	whereas	if	HSR	journey	times	exceed	four	
and	a	half	hours,	the	HSR	share	falls	below	30	per	
cent.	For	trips	of	up	to	three	hours	(as	for	Sydney-
Melbourne	and	Sydney-Brisbane),	observed	HSR	
market	shares	range	from	around	55	per	cent	up	to	
around	70	per	cent.	
This	study’s	reference	case	inter-capital	forecasts	
for	2035	have	been	included	in	the	figure	for	
comparison	and	show	a	high	degree	of	consistency	
with	the	international	experience.	Sydney-
Canberra	is	lower	than	the	expected	range	for	
journeys	less	than	two	hours,	but	this	is	largely	
explained	by	the	relatively	high	proportion	of	
passengers	transferring	to	connecting	flights,	
which	are	assumed	in	the	forecasts	not	to	divert		
to	HSR.
Figure	ES-7	 HSR	share	of	combined	HSR/air	travel	market,	comparing	the	final	model	forecast	for	2035	with	international	evidence
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Cost of constructing the 
HSR network
Internationally,	HSR	systems	are	very	reliable	
when	they	operate	as	closed	systems	dedicated	
to	high	speed	services	with	purpose-built	
infrastructure	and	train	sets.	Although	mixing	
HSR	services	with	conventional	rail	services	
on	shared	infrastructure	may	reduce	capital	
costs,	particularly	for	access	into	the	urban	
areas,	operational	performance	can	diminish	
dramatically.	Such	systems	are	generally	not	
capable	of	delivering	the	journey	times	that	would	
be	necessary	for	an	HSR	system	on	the	east	coast	
of	Australia	to	achieve	the	required	levels	of	
reliability	and	competitiveness.
To	achieve	the	target	journey	time	of	under		
three	hours	for	Sydney-Melbourne	and	
Brisbane- Sydney,	an	average	journey	speed	of	
approximately	300 kilometres	per	hour	would	need	
to	be	achieved.	This	would	require	a	system	capable	
of	a	maximum	operating	speed	of	350	kilometres	
per	hour,	to	allow	for	some	slower	sections	of	
track	due	to	terrain	or	other	operating	conditions.	
Such	average	speeds	would	not	be	possible	on	the	
existing	conventional	rail	infrastructure	on	the	east	
coast	of	Australia,	even	if	it	was	only	used	for	short	
sections	for	city	access	and	egress,	so	dedicated	
HSR	infrastructure	would	be	required.	If	the	
HSR	network	were	used	to	provide	fast	commuter	
services,	it	is	likely	they	would	not	operate	at	
such	high	speeds;	a	maximum	operating	speed	of	
200- 250	kilometres	per	hour	would	effectively	
serve	the	commuter	market,	given	the	relatively	
shorter	distances	and	more	intensive	stopping	
patterns	of	fast	commuter	services.
In	addition	to	the	physical	components	of	
capital	cost	(land,	earthworks,	structures,	track,	
equipment	and	facilities),	the	cost	estimates	
also	include	design,	program	and	construction	
management,	and	asset	renewal	when	it	would	
fall	due.	Cost	components	were	developed	
from	Australian	unit	costs	and	benchmarked	
against	international	HSR	systems	to	ensure	the	
robustness	of	the	estimates.	Rolling	stock	(train	
sets)	is	equivalent	to	a	further	nine	per	cent	of	the	
total	capital	cost,	but	this	would	only	be	expended	
as	demand	built	up	over	the	appraisal	period	and	
service	frequencies	increased.	
Tunnelling	would	be	used	where	the	terrain	
requires	it,	but	would	also	be	adopted	where	no	
dedicated	surface	route	could	be	created	without	
unacceptable	community	dislocation	and/or	
environmental	costs.	This	is	particularly	the	case	
where	the	route	passes	through	the	middle	and	
inner	suburbs	of	the	capitals,	where	no	suitable	
easements	are	available.	It	has	also	been	used	in	
some	locations	which	are	highly	environmentally	
sensitive.	In	total,	the	preferred	alignment	
includes	144	kilometres	of	tunnel	along	the	route,	
representing	around	29	per	cent	of	the	total	cost	of	
construction.	Sixty	per	cent	of	the	tunnel	length	
is	in	urban	areas,	with	67	kilometres	in	Sydney,	
eight	kilometres	in	Melbourne,	five kilometres	in	
Brisbane	and	four	kilometres	in	Canberra.
The	cost	estimates	reflect	the	use	of	proven	HSR	
system	technology	(such	as	train	control	and	power	
supply	systems)	and	train	sets	already	in	service,	
and	readily	available,	and	take	account	of	a	range	
of	manufacturers’	delivered	costs	for	existing		
HSR	systems.
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The	capital	costs	have	been	risk-adjusted	to	reflect	
uncertainty,	principally	around	the scope	of	the	
major construction,	engineering	and	operational	
elements	of	a	future	HSR	program.	Expected	
construction	costs	are	expressed	throughout	this	
chapter	in	terms	of	risk-adjusted	value,	in	$2012.	
In	total,	the	risk	adjustment	process	increased	
capital	costs	by	about	10.8	per	cent11.
The	estimated	capital	cost	for	the	full	HSR	system,	
excluding	the	cost	of	train	sets12,	is	$114.0 billion	
in	$2012,	as	shown	in	Table ES-6.
Table	ES-6	 Risk-adjusted	HSR	program	costs	($2012,	$billion)	
Project 
development
Construction
Total capital costs
Canberra Sydney- Junction-Canberra Melbourne
Newcastle-
Sydney
Brisbane- 
Gold 
Coast
Gold 
Coast 
Junction-
Newcastle
Total  
HSR  
system
2.2 2.5 1.7 1.0 3.1 10.4
20.8 24.4 17.2 10.0 31.2 103.6
23.0 26.9 18.9 11.0 34.3 114.0
Notes:	Total	does	not	add	up	exactly	due	to	rounding.	
The	references	to	‘Canberra	Junction’	and	‘Gold	Coast	Junction’	describe	the	points	at	which	the	Gold	Coast	and	Canberra	
spurs	leave	the	main	alignment.
Figure ES-8	presents	the	results	of	the	@RISK	
analysis	for	total	construction	costs	including	
development	costs	for	the	future	HSR	program13.	
The	analysis	illustrates	that:
•	 In	50	per	cent	(P50)	of	simulations,	total	
construction	costs	are	expected	to	be	less	than	
$113.9	billion	($2012).
•	 In	90	per	cent	(P90)	of	simulations,	total	
construction	costs	are	expected	to	be	less	than	
$127.0	billion	($2012).
•	 In	ten	per	cent	(P10)	of	simulations,	total	
construction	costs	are	expected	to	be	less	than	
$102.0	billion	($2012).	
11	 This	is	the	expected	risk-adjusted	cost	and	is	within	one	per	cent	of	the	median	risk-adjusted	cost,	commonly	known	as	the	P50;	the	
difference	between	them	is	due	to	the	risk	adjustment	applied	to	the	individual	cost	components	being	non-symmetrical.	Taking	into	
account	the	allowances	included	in	developing	the	non-risk-adjusted	costs,	the	risk	allowance	is	comparable	with	what	would	be	
allowed	as	a	physical	contingency	for	a	project	at	a	similar	early	stage	of	development.	
12	 Train	sets	are	assumed	to	be	leased	in	the	financial	assessment.
13	 The	frequency	represents	the	likelihood	of	the	total	construction	costs	being	within	a	$1	billion	band	centred	on	the	corresponding	
point	on	the	curve.	Thus	there	is	a	two	per	cent	chance	that	the	cost	will	lie	between	$100.5	billion	and	$101.5	billion	and	a	four	per	
cent	chance	they	lie	between	$107	billion	and	$108	billion.
    Executive Summary 
Figure	ES-8	 Total	construction	costs	(including	development	costs)	($2012,	$billion)
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Figure  ES-8
Figure ES-9	presents	estimated	average	
construction	costs	per	route	kilometre	on	a	
se ment	by	segment	basis.	The	extensive	tunnelling	
required	for	access	into	and	out	of	Sydney	increases	
the	cost	per	route	kilometre	for	these	segments	by	
two	to	three	times	compared	to	the	costs	for	the	
remainder	of	the	network.	
Parts	of	the	route	between	Brisbane	and	Newcastle	
also	have	high	costs,	reflecting	the	volume	of	
earthworks	required	in	these	areas.
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Figure	ES-9	 HSR	program	average	construction	costs	per	route-kilometre	in	staging	order	($2012,	$million)	
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Figure  ES-9Staging the development of HSR
The	size	and	complexity	of	an	HSR	system	on	the	
east	coast	of	Australia	would	be	such	that	it	could	
not	be	delivered	as	a	single	project;	instead,	it	
would	be	delivered	in	stages	linking	the	principal	
centres.	Even	these	stages	would	be	large	projects	
by	Australian	standards.	Staging	would	not	only	
allow	the	upfront	funding	to	be	reduced	and	
smooth	future	funding	requirements,	but	would	
also	better	match	system	development	to	market	
growth	and	would	allow	revenue	to	be	generated	
on	sections	of	the	system	as	they	are	completed.	
The	study	has	concluded	that	the	benefits	of	
HSR	are	strongly	related	to	the	volume	of	travel	
between	the	capital	cities,	in	particular	Sydney-
Melbourne,	and	that	establishing	this	link	would	
be	the	first	priority	for	any	HSR	network	on	the	
east	coast	of	Australia.	At	a	construction	cost	of	
about	$50	billion	in	$2012	(risk-adjusted),	the	
Sydney-Melbourne	line	would	represent	a	major	
undertaking	and	would	itself	need	to	be	staged.	
Canberra,	which	would	be	connected	by	a	spur	
line	to	the	Sydney-Melbourne	line,	is	the	next	
most	important	city	on	this	line	from	a	demand	
viewpoint	and	would	be	an	appropriate	terminal	
for	the	first	stage	to	ensure	revenue	would	be	
generated	as	early	as	possible.	
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Figure	ES-10	 Staging	of	the	preferred	HSR	system	–	commencement	of	operations
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The	staging	of	the	preferred	HSR	system	assumed	
in	the	financial	and	economic	evaluations,	as	
shown	in	Figure ES-10	and	Table ES-7,	takes	
into	account	the	extent	to	which	individual	
sections	capture	the	forecast	market,	the	cost	
of	construction	and	the	economic	and	financial	
returns	of	each	stage.	
Table	ES-7	 Staging	of	the	preferred	HSR	system	
Line 1 Sydney-Melbourne
Built 
track 
(km)*
Risk-adjusted 
cost ($b)
Cost per 
km ($m)
Potential 
operational 
date
894 49.9 56 2040
-	Stage	1:	Sydney-Canberra 283 23.0 81 2035
-	Stage	2:	Canberra-Melbourne** 611 26.9 44 2040
Line 2 Brisbane-Sydney 854 64.1 75 2058
-	Stage	3:	Newcastle-Sydney 134 18.9 141 2045
-	Stage	4:	Brisbane-Gold	Coast 115 11.0 96 2051
-	Stage	5:	Gold	Coast-Newcastle** 606 34.3 56 2058
Total 1,748 114.0 65 2058
*	Note	that	the	built	track	includes	spur	junctions	and	other	connections.	These	distances	are	different	from	the	travel	
kilometres	in	Table ES-1	and	Table ES-2.	
**	Construction	of	Stages	2	and	5	would	start	at	the	Canberra	Junction	and	Gold	Coast	Junction	respectively,	the	points	at	
which	the	Gold	Coast	and	Canberra	spurs	leave	the	main	alignment.	
Note:	Totals	do	not	add	up	exactly	due	to	rounding.
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Figure	ES-11	 Staging	of	the	preferred	HSR	system	–	cumulative	capital	costs	($2012,	$billion)
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Figure ES-11	shows	the	profile	of	cumulative	
capital	costs	over	the	HSR	program.
Line	1	between	Sydney	and	Melbourne	would	
be	a	major	undertaking	in	terms	of	planning,	
construction,	testing	and	commissioning	and,	
based	on	current	industry	experience,	would	
need	to	be	done	in	discrete	stages.	For	evaluation	
purposes,	a	start	date	of	2035	was	assumed.	
Working	back	from	that	date,	enabling	legislation	
would	need	to	be	passed	by	2019.	Prior	to	2019,	the	
final	preferred	route	and	station	locations	would	
be	determined,	further	technical	investigations	
completed	and	all	necessary	government	approvals	
obtained.	Steps	would	also	be	taken	to	preserve	the	
preferred	HSR	corridor	prior	to	any	commitment	
to	proceed.
Following	enabling	legislation,	a	period	of	more	
than	two	years	would	be	required	for	concept	
design,	environmental	impact	assessment	and	
public	consultation,	before	a	decision	to	proceed	
to	implementation	would	be	made	in	2021.	
There	would	then	be	a	procurement	period	of	
two	to	three	years	to	let	contracts	and	to	acquire	
land.	Enabling	works	would	then	be	undertaken	
(critically	at	Sydney’s	Central	station).	These	works	
are	anticipated	to	take	four	years	to	divert	the	
current	services	within	the	existing	operational	
station	before	the	main	implementation	contracts	
could	commence	in	2027	(i.e.	financial	year	2028).	
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The	implementation	program	of	a	further		
84	months	reflects	the	actual	program	to	deliver	
the	Taiwan	HSR	and	includes	a	period	of		
34	months	for	testing	and	commissioning.		
Based	on	this	evaluation	program,	the	first	
public	HSR	services	would	start	in	April	2035.	
Subsequent	stages	would	be	delivered	at	five	to	
seven	year	intervals,	with	planning	of	each	stage	
overlapping	with	construction	of	the	previous	
stage.	Under	these	assumptions,	the	entire	network	
could	be	in	operation	by	2058.	
The	staging	assumed	in	Table ES-7	could,	
however,	be	accelerated	by	about	five	years,	
although	it	would	likely	incur	additional	cost	
and	risk.	The	time	taken	to	pass	the	relevant	
legislation	and	to	make	a	formal	decision	to	
proceed	could	be	accelerated.	The	enabling	works	
could	also	be	started	earlier,	so	as	not	to	delay	
the	commencement	of	implementation	works	at	
Sydney	Central	station;	this	would	require	funding	
in	advance	of	the	formal	decision	to	proceed,	but	
could	save	18	months.	There	is	also	potential	for	
the	construction	period	to	be	shortened	by	as	much	
as	24	months,	but	this	would	require	extended	
working	hours	and	could	be	limited	by	a	lack	of	
qualified	resources.	An	accelerated	program	could	
therefore	start	with	the	Sydney	enabling	works	
in	2019,	with	Sydney-Canberra	operational	by	
2030	and	Sydney-Melbourne	operational	by	2035.	
Under	this	accelerated	program,	the	full	network	
could	be	operational	by	2053.
Financial assessment 
The	future	HSR	program	and	the	majority	of	its	
individual	stages	are	expected	to	produce	only	a	
small	positive	financial	return	on	investment.	
The	estimated	real	financial	internal	rate	of	return	
(FIRR)	for	the	program	as	a	whole	is	0.8	per	cent.	
For	Sydney	to	Melbourne,	the	estimated	(post-tax)	
real	FIRR	is	1.0	per	cent.	These	fall	well	short	
of	the	financial	returns	that	would	be	required	
by	commercial	providers	of	debt	and	equity	to	
major	infrastructure	providers14.	At	a	four	per	
cent	discount	rate,	the	financial	net	present	value	
(FNPV)	of	financial	costs	and	revenues	associated	
with	an	investment	in	HSR	would	be	negative		
$47	billion15.	Governments	would	be	required	
to	meet	the	majority	of	construction	and	
establishment	costs	for	the	HSR	network.
Post	construction,	the	future	HSR	program	
and	its	stages	(with	the	exception	of	Sydney-
Canberra	as	a	stand-alone	stage16)	are	expected	
to	generate	sufficient	operating	income	to	cover	
ongoing	operational	and	asset	renewal	costs.	This	
forecast	holds	true	for	all	but	one	of	the	scenarios	
and	sensitivities	tested.	As	a	consequence,	HSR	
operations	would	be	financially	self-sustaining	if	
traffic	and	cost	assumptions	were	met.	
Table ES-8	summarises	the	results	of	the	FNPV	
and	FIRR	analysis	on	a	pre	and	post-tax	basis	
for	the	future	HSR	program	and	its	stages.	These	
are	presented	on	a	cumulative	present	value	basis,	
with	the	summary	costs	and	revenue	obtained	by	
discounting	cashflows	by	the	evaluation	discount	
rate	of	four	per	cent	to	financial	year	2028.	Sydney-
Canberra	delivers	a	negative	financial	return.	
Neither	the	program	as	a	whole,	nor	any	of	the	
stages,	returns	a	positive	FNPV	at	a	four	per	cent	
discount	rate.	
14	 These	would	typically	be	around	15	per	cent	or	more.
15	 Discounted	to	2028	and	in	$2012.
16	 That	is,	if	Sydney-Canberra	was	operated	independently	of	any	other	HSR	line.
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Assumptions	about	the	timing	of	the	various	stages	
are	also	shown	in	Table ES-8.
Table ES-9	sets	out	the	summary	of	risk-adjusted	
capital	costs,	revenues,	operating	costs	and	asset	
renewals	over	the	evaluation	period	to	2085.	
The	HSR	program	as	a	whole	delivers	a	positive	
net	operating	surplus.	That	is,	for	the	preferred	
HSR	system,	revenues	would	cover	ongoing	
operating	costs	and	the	costs	of	renewing	assets	
when	they	wear	out.	Therefore,	provided	traffic	
forecasts	and	costs	estimates	are	met,	no	ongoing	
government	subsidy	would	be	required	to	sustain	
HSR	operations	once	the	system	is	constructed	
and	operational.	As	traffic	builds	up,	the	ability	of	
transport	operations	to	return	some	of	the	capital	
costs	would	increase.
Table	ES-8	 Summary	of	FNPV	and	FIRR	results	(present	value	discounted	to	2028,	$2012,	$billion,	4%	discount	rate)
Future HSR program
Sydney- Sydney- Newcastle- Brisbane- Network 
17Canberra Melbourne Melbourne Gold Coast & complete 
Newcastle- 
Melbourne
Year operations 2035 2040 2045 2051 2058commence
Total	costs 20.9 41.1 52.8 58.3 72.0
Net	operating	result* -0.4 10.5 11.6 11.3 15.5
FIRR (real) n/a 1.0% 0.9% 0.4% 0.8%
FIRR (real, pre-tax) n/a 1.4% 0.9% 0.4% 0.8%
FNPV -21.5 -26.5 -35.2 -41.3 -47.0
FNPV (pre-tax) -21.5 -25.0 -35.2 -41.3 -47.0
Notes:	*	Revenues	less	operating	costs	including	payments	for	rolling	stock	leases	and	asset	renewal.	Due	to	accumulated	
tax	losses	(primarily	from	depreciation	on	the	infrastructure	asset	base),	only	the	Sydney-Melbourne	HSR	stage	pays	
corporation	tax	during	the	evaluation	period.	Where	tax	is	not	payable,	the	FIRR	and	FNPV	do	not	differ	on	a	pre	and	
post-tax	basis.	
‘n/a’	denotes	an	FIRR	of	less	than	zero	per	cent	that	cannot	be	mathematically	calculated.
17	 Network	complete	represents	the	entire	HSR	network	between	Brisbane	and	Melbourne.
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Table	ES-9	 Summary	risk-adjusted	capital	costs,	revenues,	operating	costs	and	asset	renewals	over	the	total	evaluation	period	to	2085	
(present	value	discounted	to	2028,	$2012,	$billion,	4%	discount	rate)
Sydney- Sydney- Newcastle- Brisbane- Network 
Canberra Melbourne Melbourne Gold complete
Coast & 
Newcastle-
Melbourne
Year operations 2035 2040 2045 2051 2058commence
Total	development	costs 2.3 4.7 6.1 6.8 8.8
Total	construction	costs 18.6 36.4 46.7 51.5 63.2
Total capital costs 20.9 41.1 52.8 58.3 72.0
Total	revenue 5.0 39.4 43.0 43.5 62.7
Total	operating	costs 4.4 25.1 27.3 27.9 42.2
Total	payments	for	rolling	
0.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.8
stock	finance	leases
Total	asset	renewals 1.0 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.2
Total operating result -0.4 10.5 11.6 11.3 15.5
Terminal value -0.2 4.0 5.6 5.4 9.1
FNPV -21.5 -26.5 -35.2 -41.3 -47.0
Note:	Total	may	not	be	exact	due	to	timing	and	rounding	differences.
Risk-adjusted	project	cashflows	for	each	year	of	the	
evaluation	period,	reflecting	the	proposed	staging	
of	the	HSR	program,	are	shown	in	Figure ES-12.	
Total	annual	project	capital	expenditure	ranges	
from	$2 billion	to	$8	billion	in	each	of	the	eight	
years	prior	to	the	opening	of	the	Sydney-Canberra	
section	in	2035,	and	then	continues	at	between		
$2	billion	and	$7	billion	per	year	for	the	next	
23 years	until	the	full	network	is	operational	
in 2058.
    Executive Summary 
Figure	ES-12	 HSR	program	risk-adjusted	project	cashflows	per	year	($2012,	$billion)	
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Figure  ES-13
With	the	exception	of	the	costs	associated	with	
accessing	Sydney	(as	shown	in	Figure ES-9),	
capital	costs	increase	broadly	in	proportion	to	
the	length	of	the	HSR	line	being	constructed.	
As	indicated	in	Figure ES-12,	extensions	to	the	
network	lead	to	step	changes	in	patronage	and	
therefore	are	critical	to	the	operating	cashflows.	
For	instance,	completing	Sydney-Canberra	or	
Canberra-Melbourne	as	stand-alone	segments	
would	produce	only	moderate	passenger	demand	
and	financial	returns.	When	the	whole	line	
connecting	Sydney-Melbourne	is	completed,	
significant	additional	demand	would	be	generated	
(passenger	numbers	at	that	point	increase	by	a	
factor	of	five).	Operating	cashflows	and	returns	
then	also	improve,	reflecting	the	growth	in	
patronage	without	a	correspondingly	material	
increase	in	capital	costs.	The	same	benefit	would	
be	observed	when	the	Gold	Coast	is	connected	to	
Newcastle	and	the	full	HSR	system	is	in	operation,	
resulting	in	a	considerable	uplift	in	demand	
between	Brisbane,	Sydney	and	Melbourne.	The	
financial	performance	(annual	cashflow)	of	each	
stage	is	summarised	in	Figure ES-13.
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Figure	ES-13	 HSR	program	risk-adjusted	cashflows	per	year	by	stage	($2012,	$billion)	
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Figure 2 
Due	to	the	future	HSR	program’s	expected	low	
financial	returns,	significant	private	sector	funding	
(debt/equity)	would	not	be	available	or	appropriate	
to	finance	the	program.	As	such,	a	considerable	
commercial	financing	gap	would	exist	between	
the	total	capital	cost	of	the	HSR	program	and	the	
amount	of	financing	that	could	be	raised	from	the	
financial	markets	on	commercial	terms,	based	on	
the	future	HSR	program	operating	cashflows.
Based	on	the	detailed	analysis	of	program	
cashflows,	the	commercial	financing	gap	for	the	
entire	HSR	program	would	be	about	$98	billion	(or	
86	per	cent	of	the	total	risk-adjusted	capital	cost)	as	
shown	in	Table ES-10.	For	the	Sydney-Melbourne	
line,	the	commercial	financing	gap	would	be	about	
$45	billion,	or	92 per	cent	of	the	total	capital	cost.	
    Executive Summary 
Table	ES-10	 Summary	of	the	commercial	financing	gap	–	reference	case	($2012,	$billion)
Total capital cost 
Debt carrying capacity
Commercial coverage 
Commercial financing gap 
HSR program
114.0
16.3
14%
97.7
Sydney-Melbourne
49.9
4.1
8%
45.7
Value	capture	has	the	potential	to	partially	close	
the	commercial	financing	gap	through	measures	
such	as	government	land	sales	and	capturing	the	
incremental	impact	that	the	HSR	program	would	
have	on	stamp	duty,	developments	and	rates	in	
the	HSR	affected	zones.	However,	this	would	be	
a	small	contribution	at	best.	It	is	highly	unlikely	
that	all	of	these	measures	would	be	implemented	
and	the	ultimate	benefit	that	value	capture	might	
have	on	closing	the	commercial	financing	gap	is	
therefore	difficult	to	determine	at	this	stage.	
Ultimately	governments	would	be	required	to	
fund	the	majority	of	the	future	HSR	program’s	
upfront	capital	costs.	A	summary	of	the	cashflow	
implications	for	government	for	the	whole	network	
is	presented	in	Figure ES-14.
Figure	ES-14	 HSR	program	government	cashflows	($2012,	$billion)	
Figure  ES-14
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Economic assessment
The	study	adopted	a	cost-benefit	methodology	
that	is	conventionally	applied	to	major	transport	
infrastructure	projects.	The	cost	components	
of	the	analysis,	including	the	necessary	capital	
expenditure	required	to	develop,	construct	and	
renew	the	HSR	system	as	components	wear	out,	
depend	on	the	proposed	HSR	engineering	and	
technical	specifications	adopted	for	the	preferred	
HSR	system	and	on	the	assumed	staging	of	
network	development	set	out	in	Table ES-7.		
For	the	purposes	of	evaluation,	construction	of	
stage	1	of	Line	1	(i.e.	the	Sydney-Canberra	stage	of	
the	Sydney-Melbourne	line)	is	assumed	to	start	in	
July	2027	(start	of	financial	year	2028).
Once	constructed,	the	HSR	system	would	generate	
a	stream	of	economic	benefits,	linked	to	the	
assessment	of	future	travel	demand.	In	general	
terms,	the	total	economic	benefit	of	travel	on	HSR	
would	depend	on	how	much	each	passenger	values	
their	trip,	often	termed	their	‘willingness	to	pay’.	
This	is	calculated	by	measuring	the	differences	
in	generalised	trip	costs	when	comparing	the	
reference	case	(with	HSR)	to	the	base	case	(without	
HSR).	Aggregating	willingness	to	pay	across	all	
users	of	HSR	and	over	time	provides	an	assessment	
of	the	total	(gross)	economic	value	created	for	users	
of	the	system	by	the	investment	in	a	future		
HSR	program.
Transporting	passengers	consumes	economic	
resources	such	as	labour	and	fuel.	Because	HSR	
could	reduce	demand	for	other	modes	of	transport,	
and	hence	their	consumption	of	resources,	the	
additional	resources	required	for	HSR	need	to	be	
offset	against	the	resources	avoided	in	other	modes.	
The	net	change	in	resources	is	deducted	from	the	
gross	economic	value	to	calculate	the	stream	of	
economic	benefits	derived	from	the	investment		
in	HSR.	
The	distribution	of	the	net	benefits	between	the	
users	and	the	operator(s)	of	the	HSR	system	is	
determined	by	the	prices	charged.	Ultimately,	
prices	would	serve	to	transfer	economic	value	
from	users	of	the	system	to	its	operators.	Revenue	
is	therefore	included	in	the	calculations	(as	a	cost	
to	users	and	a	benefit	to	operators)	to	assess	the	
relative	benefits	to	users	and	operators.		
The	net	economic	benefits	internal	to	the	transport	
system	are	therefore	measured	by	adding	the		
two	components:
•	 User	benefits	(or	consumer	surplus)	are	
calculated	based	on	the	difference	between	a	
user’s	willingness	to	pay	for	a	service	and	the	
actual	price	paid.	
•	 Operator	benefits	(or	producer	surplus)	
represent	the	difference	between	the	price	paid	
or	revenue	generated	by	a	service	and	the	costs	
associated	with	(or	resources	consumed	by)	
operating	the	service.	The	change	in	operator	
benefits	is	assessed	for	each	mode	(i.e.	HSR,	
aviation,	conventional	rail	and	coach).	
In	addition,	there	would	be	costs	and	benefits	that	
are	external	to	the	transport	system	that	can	be	
measured	in	monetary	terms	and	included	in	the	
cost-benefit	analysis.	These	externalities	measure	
the	impact	of	HSR	to	the	broader	community,	
including	environmental	and	safety	impacts,	
decongestion	benefits	and	any	alternative	avoided	
or	deferred	transport	network	capital	expenditure.	
A	residual	value	has	also	been	included	to	capture	
the	remaining	value	of	the	assets	at	the	end	of	the	
evaluation	period18.	The	present	values	of	costs	and	
benefits	by	category,	discounted	at	four	per	cent,	
are	shown	in	Figure ES-1519.	The	economic	net	
present	value	(ENPV)	is	the	sum	of	the	present	
value	of	the	economic	costs	and	benefits,	which	for	
the	program	as	a	whole	is	$101	billion.
18	 A	50	year	evaluation	period	has	been	adopted,	commencing	in	2035.
19	 The	discount	rate	converts	cashflows	of	future	costs	and	benefits	into	present	day	dollars	to	allow	a	comparison	of	costs	and	benefits,	
expressed	in	$2012,	and	using	a	common	base	year,	in	this	case	financial	year	2028,	which	is	the	assumed	start	of	construction	of	the	
first	stage.
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Figure	ES-15	 Present	value	of	costs	and	benefits	for	the	HSR	program	(present	value	discounted	to	2028,	$2012,	$billion,		
4%	discount	rate)
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The	HSR	user	benefits	dominate	the	economic	
results	and	account	for	90	per	cent	of	the	estimated	
benefits	(excluding	the	residual	value).	A	key	
component	is	the	assessment	of	time	savings	for	
travellers	across	their	full	journey	including	travel	
time,	waiting	time,	check-in	time	and	access	
time,	with	adjustments	for	the	inconvenience	of	
having	to	change	modes.	Travel	time	savings	are	
measured	using	values	of	time	based	on	market	
research	conducted	for	this	study	and	tested	for	
reasonableness	against	conventional	values	used	in	
road	projects,	which	vary	by	trip	purpose		
(e.g.	business	versus	leisure)20.	
Business	travellers	would	gain	the	majority	of	user	
benefits	due	to	their	higher	value	of	time,	even	
though	they	only	represent	about	35	per	cent	of	the	
total	HSR	travel	market,	as	shown	in	Table ES-11.
20	Austroads,	Guide to Project Evaluation,	2012.
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Table	ES-11	 User	benefit	estimates	by	market	segment	(present	value	discounted	to	2028,	$2012,	$billion)
Short regional 
Long regional 
Inter-city 
Total
Business users Leisure users Total
9.1
58.4
73.2
140.7
1.7 7.4
31.3 27.1
60.6 12.6
93.6 47.1
The	summary	results	for	the	reference	case	predict	
that	an	investment	in	the	preferred	HSR	program	
would	generate	an	economic	internal	rate	of	return	
(EIRR)	of	7.6	per	cent	and	an	economic	cost-
benefit	ratio	(EBCR)	of	2.3	using	a	four	per	cent	
discount	rate21.	A	seven	per	cent	discount	rate	has	
also	been	tested	and	would	reduce	the	ENPV	to		
$5	billion	and	the	EBCR	to	1.1,	as	shown	in		
Table ES-12;	although	marginal,	the	estimated	
economic	benefits	remain	positive.
Table	ES-12	 Summary	economic	indicators	for	the	HSR	program	(present	value	discounted	to	2028,	$2012,	$billion)
4% discount rate 7% discount rate
Total	costs 79.3 58.9
Total	benefits 180.6 63.8
EIRR 7.6% 7.6%
ENPV 101.3 4.9
1.1EBCR 2.3
Sydney-Melbourne	is	the	strongest	performing	line,	with	an	estimated	EIRR	of	7.8	per	cent,	as	shown	in	
Table ES-13.	It	has	an	estimated	positive	ENPV	of	$69	billion	and	an	EBCR	of	2.5	when	measured	on	a	
stand-alone	basis.
Table	ES-13	 Summary	economic	indicators	for	Sydney-Melbourne	(present	value	discounted	to	2028,	$2012,	$billion)
4% discount rate 7% discount rate
Total	costs 46.5 38.9
Total	benefits 115.7 45.3
EIRR 7.8% 7.8%
ENPV 69.3 6.5
EBCR 2.5 1.2
Note:	Totals	do	not	add	up	exactly	due	to	rounding.
21	 The	EIRR	represents	the	discount	rate	that	makes	the	net	present	value	of	all	economic	cashflows	equal	to	zero.	The	higher	the	EIRR	
the	greater	the	net	economic	returns	achieved	by	a	project	relative	to	its	capital	resource	costs	and	if	EIRR	is	greater	than	the	
discount	rate,	then	the	project	would	deliver	a	positive	net	economic	benefit.
    Executive Summary 
The	incremental	economic	results	for	each	
additional	stage	of	the	preferred	HSR	program	
are	set	out	in	Table ES-14.	The	results	support	
the	preferred	staging	of	the	HSR	program,	with	
Sydney-Melbourne	delivering	an	estimated	EIRR	
of	7.8	per	cent.	The	subsequent	northern	stages	
from	Newcastle-Melbourne	and	Brisbane-Gold	
Coast	add	little	incremental	economic	value	on	a	
stand-alone	basis	(i.e.	ENPV	does	not	materially	
change)	and	the	results	suggest	they	would	not	be	
undertaken	unless	the	intention	were	to	complete	
the	line	connecting	Brisbane	and	Sydney.	
Table	ES-14	 Incremental	economic	impacts	for	each	additional	stage	of	the	HSR	program	(present	value	discounted	to	2028,	$2012,	
$billion)
Year operations  
commence
Future HSR program
Sydney-
Canberra
Sydney- 
Melbourne
Newcastle- 
Melbourne
Brisbane-
Gold 
Coast & 
Newcastle-
Melbourne
Network 
complete  
(i.e. Brisbane-
Melbourne)
2035 2040 2045 2051 2058
Total	costs* 22.2 46.5 58.6 64.3 79.3
Total	benefits 20.4 115.7 126.7 126.7 180.6
EIRR 3.8% 7.8% 7.3% 7.1% 7.6%
ENPV -1.7 69.3 68.1 63.9 101.3
EBCR 0.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.3
*	Costs	include	rolling	stock	and	asset	renewal	costs.
Overall,	the	results	of	the	analysis	present	a	
positive	economic	case	for	the	introduction	of	
HSR.	Forecasts	were	prepared	for	the	reference	
case	(i.e.	with	HSR)	which	was	part	of	the	central	
case	for	evaluation	purposes.	The	reference	case	
reflects	a	range	of	long-term	assumptions	and	
expectations,	including:
•	 Strong	growth	in	the	base	travel	market	over	
the	52	years	to	2065	(travel	on	the	east	coast	
will	more	than	double	from	153	million	trips	to	
355	million	trips).	
•	 No	significant	increase	in	aviation	capacity	
in	the	Sydney	basin.	This	results	in	increased	
delays	and	the	inability	of	passengers	to	travel	
at	preferred	times,	consistent	with	assumptions	
in	the	Joint	Study	on	Aviation	Capacity	for	the	
Sydney	Region22.	Assumed	additional	aviation	
capacity	in	Sydney	has	the	effect	of	reducing	
the	estimated	EIRR	for	the	HSR	program	as	
a	whole	from	7.6	per	cent	to	7.1	per	cent	and	
reducing	the	ECBR	from	2.3	to	2.1.	Additional	
aviation	capacity	also	reduces	the	financial	
return	from	0.8	per	cent	to	0.3	per	cent.
22	 Australian	Government	and	NSW	Government,	Joint Study on Aviation Capacity for the Sydney Region,	Canberra,	2012.
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•	 HSR	fares	would	be	structured	to	be	
comparable	to	and	competitive	with	alternative	
modes	of	transport	for	both	business	and	
leisure	purposes.	HSR	fares	have	been	set	
to	be	competitive	with	air	fares	on	the	main	
inter-capital	routes	on	the	east	coast,	trending	
downwards	over	time	by	0.5	per	cent	per	year	
to	2015	and	remaining	constant	thereafter,	
consistent	with	the	forecast	reduction	in	real	
air	fares.	Car	operating	costs	increase	over	time	
due	to	a	forecast	real	increase	in	the	cost	of	fuel	
(13	per	cent	real	increase	by	2065	after	allowing	
for	forecast	improvements	in	fuel	efficiency).	
–	 If	HSR	fares	were	increased	by	30	per	
cent,	the	EIRR	for	the	program	as	a	whole	
would	reduce	to	7.4	per	cent.	However,	the	
financial	return	would	improve	from		
0.8	per	cent	to	2.3 per	cent,	with	operating	
cashflows	becoming	positive	three	years	
earlier	in	2038.	
–	 If	HSR	fares	were	increased	by	50	per	cent,	
economic	returns	would	fall	further	but	
HSR	would	still	produce	substantial	net	
economic	gains,	with	an	EIRR	of	7.2	per	
cent	and	an	EBCR	of	2.1	(at	a	four	per	cent	
discount	rate).	The	financial	return	would	
improve	further	to	three	per	cent.
Competitive aviation response
The	study	predicts	that	over	half	the	83.6	million	HSR	trips	forecast	in	2065	would	be	diverted	from	
air,	which	would	have	a	significant	impact	on	aviation	markets.	
Airline	services	are	mobile	in	the	sense	that	there	are	few	significant	sunk	capital	costs	in	servicing	
particular	routes	and	assets	can	be	quickly	redeployed	to	other	routes.	Airlines	operating	along	key	
regional	and	inter-capital	routes	across	the	east	coast	of	Australia	already	compete	strongly	against	each	
other,	and	fare	levels	of	many	fare	classes	have	declined	over	time,	which	suggests	that	airfare	levels	are	
already	highly	competitive	on	major	routes.	
It	is	not	expected	that	airlines	would	respond	to	HSR	competition	by	reducing	their	fares	on	a	sustained	
basis.	Rather,	it	has	been	assumed	that	airlines	would	quickly	reduce	capacity,	either	by	reducing	
frequencies	or	aircraft	sizes,	to	locations	within	the	HSR	corridor	where	there	is	significant	passenger	
diversion	to	HSR.	This	assumption	is	consistent	with	overseas	experience	where,	following	the	
introduction	of	HSR,	the	airline	response	has	generally	been	to	reduce	services	on	the		
competitive	route.	
Airlines	do	not	control	all	of	the	components	of	an	end	to	end	journey	by	air	that	influence	the	relative	
competitiveness	of	air	travel	and	HSR	travel.	Most	important	of	these	are	the	cost	of	accessing	the	
airport,	its	location	relative	to	HSR	stations	and	airport	capacity.	Nevertheless,	to	the	extent	that	
airlines	are	able	to	innovate	in	ways	that	have	not	been	anticipated	in	this	study,	it	could	have	an	impact	
on	actual	HSR	patronage.	
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A	low	demand/high	cost	sensitivity	was	
developed	that	included	a	range	of	alternative	
assumptions	which	in	combination	result	in	a	set	
of	circumstances	unfavourable	to	HSR.	The	low	
demand/high	cost	scenario	includes:
•	 No	aviation	capacity	constraints	in	Sydney.
•	 A	30	per	cent	increase	in	pre-risk	capital	costs.
•	 Low	population	growth	and	low		
economic	growth.
•	 A	50	per	cent	increase	in	HSR	fares.
While	the	combination	of	these	assumptions	may	
be	unlikely,	the	results	of	the	analysis	provide	a	
useful	basis	for	comparison	and	an	understanding	
of	the	economic	performance	of	the	HSR	program.	
The	combination	of	assumptions	significantly	
reduces	the	economic	return	generated	by	the	
future	HSR	program	from	7.6	per	cent	to		
3.8	per	cent.	The	impact	on	the	financial	return	is,	
however,	modest	with	the	higher	costs	offset	by	the	
large	fare	increase.
The	economic	and	financial	results	were	tested	
against	a	range	of	sensitivity	tests,	with	the	results	
summarised	in	Figure ES-16	and	Figure ES-17:
•	 The	low	growth	scenario	assumes	lower	
economic	and	population	growth	(relative	to	
the	reference	case)	resulting	in	lower	overall	
demand	for	transport	and	thus	lower	demand	
for	HSR.	It	assumes	per	capita	GDP	growth	
rates	are	assumed	to	be	0.3	per	cent	per	year	
lower	than	the	reference	case,	and	population	
growth	is	assumed	to	be	51	per	cent	between	
2010	and	2065,	compared	to	72	per	cent	in	the	
reference	case.	
•	 The	high	growth	scenario	assumes	that	the	
Australian	economy	experiences	strong	growth	
into	the	future	(high	GDP	growth),	with	high	
population	growth.	This	scenario	results	in	
higher	overall	demand	for	transport	and	thus	
higher	demand	for	HSR.	Per	capita	GDP	
growth	rates	are	assumed	to	be	0.3	per	cent	
per	year	higher	than	in	the	reference	case,	and	
population	growth	is	assumed	to	be	103 per	
cent	between	2010	and	2065,	compared	to		
72	per	cent	in	the	reference	case.	
•	 Higher	(+30	per	cent	and	+50	per	cent)		
HSR	fares.
•	 An	aggressive	competitive	aviation	response	
which	results	in	a	50	per	cent	reduction	in	fares	
for	two	years.
•	 Additional	aviation	capacity	within	the	Sydney	
region,	which	removes	the	negative	effects	of	
travel	time	on	flights	to/from	Sydney	from	the	
reference	case,	and	assumes	there	is	no		
unmet	demand.
•	 Additional	aviation	capacity	within	the	Sydney	
region,	combined	with	30	per	cent	increase	in	
HSR	fares.	
•	 Low	demand	and	high	costs	(described	above).
•	 Mode	choice	model	sensitivities	(including	
alternative	specific	constants	(ASCs),	access/
egress	weighting	and	values	of	time).
•	 Higher	(+30	per	cent)	capital	and		
operating	costs.
•	 Lower	(−10	per	cent)	capital	and		
operating	costs.
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Figure	ES-16	 Impact	of	alternative	assumptions	on	the	economic	results	(EIRR)
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Figure	ES-17	 Impact	of	alternative	assumptions	on	the	financial	results	(real	FIRR	post	tax)
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Environmental and 
social assessment
A	strategic	environmental	assessment	framework,	
consistent	with	Australian	Government	guidelines,	
was	developed	and	its	key	principles	incorporated	
into	the	selection	of	the	preferred	alignment	
and	station	locations	to	reduce	the	potential	for	
negative	environmental	impacts	should	there	be	a	
decision	to	proceed	with	HSR.	
A	preliminary	strategic	assessment	of	the	
environmental	and	social	aspects	of	a	HSR	system	
on	the	east	coast	was	undertaken	for	three	reasons:
•	 To	ensure	that	environmental	factors	were	
integrated	into	the	development	of	the	HSR	
system,	including	decisions	about	the	corridor	
selection,	alignment,	station	locations	and	
design	features.	
•	 To	ensure	that	the	overall	HSR	system	is	
consistent	with	principles	of	ecologically	
sustainable	development.
•	 To	identify	important	environmental	and	social	
issues	to	be	further	investigated	and	assessed	in	
the	implementation	phases,	should	a	decision	be	
made	to	proceed	with	HSR.
The	assessment	of	the	environmental	impacts	
of	HSR	was	integrated	into	the	evaluation	of	
alignment	options	and	station	options,	using	a	
Geographic	Information	System	(GIS)	toolkit	
to	identify	potential	ecological	and	heritage	
interactions	and	land	use	planning	constraints	and	
opportunities	associated	with	the	various	options.	
These	evaluations	were	combined	with	other	
considerations,	such	as	engineering	parameters,	
constructability,	cost	and	user	benefits	to	determine	
the	preferred	alignment	and	station	locations.
The	preferred	HSR	alignment	and	stations	were	
selected	to	avoid,	wherever	possible,	significant	
impacts	on	communities	and	ecological	and	
heritage	resources.	Residual	impacts	would	be	
managed	by	mitigation	strategies	developed	during	
the	concept	and	detailed	design	phases	of	HSR	
development,	should	a	decision	be	made	to	proceed	
with	HSR.	This	is	a	standard	practice	for	large	
infrastructure	projects.	Where	necessary,	offsets	for	
natural	environments	could	also	be	used.
In	addition,	the	assessment	of	environmental	
issues	associated	with	HSR	has	addressed	noise	
and	vibration,	energy	use	and	carbon	emissions/
greenhouse	gas	considerations,	the	implications	of	
climate	change,	and	the	promotion	of	ecologically	
sustainable	development	(ESD).	Additional	
detailed	investigations	would	be	required	across	
each	of	these	disciplines,	should	governments	
decide	to	proceed	with	HSR,	to	minimise	the	
environmental	impacts	and	maximise	potential	
positive	outcomes.
The	social	impacts	have	been	canvassed	through	
theme-based	case	studies	into	three	key		
areas	identified	through	research	and		
stakeholder	consultation:	
a.	 Workforce	and	community	development.
b.	 Access	to	health	and	other	public	services.
c.	 Tourism,	recreation	and	social	inclusion.	
The	case	studies	highlight	that	HSR	could	
potentially	have	a	range	of	both	positive	and	
negative	impacts.	
Broader impacts of HSR
Impacts on regions
International	evidence	demonstrates	that	HSR	can	
contribute	to,	but	is	not	always	a	cause	of,	regional	
development.	Implementation	of	HSR	would	
significantly	improve	accessibility	between	capital	
cities	and	regional	centres	and	would	provide	
the	potential	for	significant	regional	economic	
development.	However,	the	extent	to	which	
regional	towns	and	cities	served	by	HSR	take	
advantage	of	that	potential	would	depend	on:
•	 Supportive	and	aligned	regional	development	
policies	at	the	Commonwealth,	state	and		
local	levels.
•	 The	availability	and	appropriate	application		
of	investment.	
•	 Metropolitan	and	regional	planning	policies	
that	encourage	and	support	new	development	in	
regional	centres	with	HSR	stations.
•	 The	timing	of	HSR	opening	in	relation	to	broad	
economic	trends.
  High Speed Rail Phase 2 / 37
Robust	and	pragmatic	planning	would	be	required	
to	determine	how	these	initiatives	should	be	
developed	and	what	outcomes	should	be	pursued.	
In	part,	they	are	associated	with	the	nature	and	
scale	of	the	proposed	HSR	network	and	require	
forecasting	responses	and	conditions	many	years	
into	the	future.	They	are	also	uncertain,	however,	
because	they	would	require	responses	from	outside	
the	transport	sector.	They	would	need	businesses	to	
change	how	they	operate,	investments	to	switch	to	
new	locations,	and	tourists	to	change	their		
travel	patterns.
An	investment	of	the	magnitude	and	nature	of	
HSR	could	also	have	unintended	consequences	
and	impacts,	such	as	causing	small	regional	cities	
to	lose	jobs	and	residents	to	nearby	regional	
centres	with	HSR	stations.	These	negative	impacts	
would	need	to	be	managed	though	effective	
regional	development	policies,	early	and	careful	
planning	to	position	local	businesses	for	change,	
and	appropriate	human	and	capital	investment	in	
complementary	assets.	
To	gain	positive	and	sustained	benefits	from	
HSR,	regional	communities	along	the	corridors	
would	need	to	follow	deliberate	strategies.	HSR	
is	not	a	panacea	for	regional	development	but,	
when	coupled	with	appropriate	strategies	and	
plans,	it	could	have	a	positive	impact	on	regional	
communities	over	time.
In	examining	the	potential	impacts	of	HSR,	the	
inherent	uncertainties	need	to	be	acknowledged.	
However,	with	proactive	and	positive	responses	
from	key	stakeholders,	the	implementation	of	
HSR	could	result	in	improvements	in	regional	
productivity,	changes	to	tourist	spending	patterns	
and,	for	regions	closer	to	the	capital	cities,	changes	
to	commuting	patterns.	Emerging	international	
evidence	suggests	that	wider	economic	impacts	
at	the	regional	level	may	be	generated	by	regional	
accessibility	improvements,	though	quantitative	
estimates	of	these	are	considered	neither	
sufficiently	certain	nor	robust	for	inclusion	in	the	
main	economic	assessment.
Impacts on cities
HSR	could	have	wider	economic	impacts	on	
cities	through	its	impact	on	effective	employment	
density,	that	is,	by	bringing	places	of	residence	and	
employment	closer	together	by	a	reduction	in	travel	
times.	Benefits	can	then	arise	in	a	number	of	ways:
•	 It	is	easier	to	match	workers	to	specific	
vacancies	and	to	find	employees	with	
appropriate	skills.	
•	 It	enables	greater	specialisation	of	supply,	
leading	to	more	efficient	production	of	goods	
and	provision	of	services.
•	 It	leads	to	knowledge	spill-over	(i.e.	greater	
opportunities	for	formal	and	informal	contact	
through	increased	accessibility).
•	 Employees	have	a	greater	choice	of	jobs.
•	 There	is	more	competition	between	companies	
and	between	individuals.
As	the	HSR	system	is	constructed,	accessibility	to	
major	cities	from	areas	such	as	the	Central	Coast	
(to	Sydney)	and	the	Gold	Coast	(to	Brisbane)	
would	improve,	allowing	employers	to	access	a	
larger	labour	pool	and	providing	employees	with	
a	wider	choice	of	employers.	Internationally,	
positive	economic	benefits	have	been	attributed	
to	such	impacts,	so	called	agglomeration	benefits,	
and	included	in	the	quantitative	assessment	of	the	
benefits	of	investments	in	transport	infrastructure.	
However,	as	noted	above,	because	of	the	
uncertainty	of	these	effects	in	the	current	context,	
no	adjustments	to	the	economic	returns	have	been	
made	for	them	in	this	study.
Impacts on the national economy
Although	the	majority	of	benefits	of	HSR	would	
accrue	to	users	of	the	system,	HSR	would	have	
a	positive	net	impact	on	the	size	of	the	national	
economy,	with	GDP	estimated	to	be	0.1	per	cent	
higher	relative	to	the	baseline	in	2085.
HSR	would	also	raise	the	overall	level	of	
investment	in	Australia.	In	2036,	HSR	investment	
would	represent	0.8	per	cent	of	aggregate	
investment	in	the	economy,	and	would	average	
around	0.4	per	cent	during	the	construction	period	
as	a	whole.	The	assumption	that	HSR	would	be	
financed	domestically	means	that,	to	accumulate	
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the	required	HSR	capital	stock,	some	of	Australia’s	
pool	of	investment	would	be	channelled	into	HSR	
instead	of	elsewhere.	This	investment	substitution	
effect	produces	a	negative	impact	on	the	economy,	
since	it	assumes	that	investment	would	be	diverted	
away	from	sectors	with	a	higher	financial	return	
than	would	be	achievable	for	HSR	(which	is	
projected	to	achieve	only	a	0.8	per	cent	financial	
rate	of	return	on	capital	invested),	lowering	
Australia’s	average	return	on	investment.	Other	
things	being	equal,	and	in	the	absence	of	higher	
productivity	benefits	generated	by	HSR,	this	
would	lower	consumption	and	GDP.	However,	
business	travel	time	savings	generated	by	HSR	are	
estimated	to	increase	labour	productivity,	which	
over	the	long	term	drives	gains	in	GDP,	offsetting	
the	negative	investment	impacts.	
The	investment	impacts	of	HSR	would	be	different	
if	it	were	assumed	to	be	financed	by	borrowing	
from	foreign	sources.	There	would	be	less	crowding	
out	of	higher	return	capital,	but	costs	involved	with	
servicing	the	foreign	debt	would	be	incurred.
Real	consumption	is	estimated	to	decrease	during	
the	construction	of	HSR	(until	around	2056).	
Post	2056,	real	consumption	begins	to	increase	
relative	to	the	baseline	as	benefits	start	to	flow	
from	the	operation	of	HSR.	As	investment	in	
HSR	tails	off	and	productivity	gains	flow	from	the	
operational	phase,	resources	can	be	redirected	to	
other	investment	uses	and	to	consumption,	and	
national	income	(moving	closely	with	GDP	due	to	
the	assumption	of	domestic	financing)	begins	to	
increase	and	move	above	the	baseline.	
Similarly,	the	investment	substitution	effect	
means	that	HSR	would	impact	each	of	the	
Australian	states	in	different	ways.	All	else	being	
equal,	an	increase	in	investment	in	one	state,	for	
example,	would	result	in	a	reduction	in	the	level	
of	investment	across	the	remaining	states.	In	the	
case	of	HSR,	the	impact	on	each	state	reflects	the	
strength	of	investment	in	and	operation	of	HSR,	
and	the	concentration	of	industries	that	compete	
for	HSR	inputs	within	each	state.	
Based	on	these	assumptions,	NSW/ACT	is	
expected	to	be	the	primary	beneficiary	state	from	
HSR	due	to	the	substantial	investment	it	receives.	
The	expansion	in	NSW/ACT’s	GSP	would	
come	at	a	cost	to	the	other	states,	which	would	
share	the	burden	of	reduced	investment	in	other	
sectors.	Productivity	gains	are	also	expected	to	be	
concentrated	in	NSW/ACT,	although	there	would	
still	be	sufficient	gains	in	Victoria	and	Queensland	
to	yield	a	positive	GSP	impact.
The	construction	of	HSR	draws	labour	into	NSW/
ACT	and	away	from	other	states.	The	assumed	
constraint	on	labour	supply	means	that	the	bulk	
of	the	expansion	in	construction	sector	labour	
requirements	in	NSW/ACT	would	have	to	be	
offset	by	contractions	in	other	sectors,	leading	to	
varying	impacts	on	employment	by	state	similar	to	
impacts	on	GSP	by	state,	but	with	less	intensity.	
While	beyond	the	scope	of	the	modelling,	
alternative	funding	arrangements	involving	a	
different	sharing	of	the	financing	of	HSR	would	
clearly	alter	the	pattern	of	gains	and	losses	in	
different	regions.
Implementing a future 
HSR program
Roles of the public and private sectors
The	Australian	Government,	ACT	Government	
and	relevant	state	governments	would	need	to	
have	a	central	role	in	the	development	of	HSR.	
This	would	be	due	both	to	its	strategic	nature	and	
to	the	fact	that	the	Australian	public	would	have	
to	fund	most	of	the	infrastructure.	Governments	
would	own	the	infrastructure	and	would	have	
an	obligation	to	ensure	that	it	was	efficiently	and	
effectively	provided	and	used.	
With	an	initial	capital	cost	in	excess	of		
$100	billion,	a	future	HSR	program	would	be	
one	of	the	largest	infrastructure	programs	ever	
undertaken	in	Australia.	Its	size	would	challenge	
the	resources	of	the	supplier	industry,	both	
domestically	and	globally,	with	only	a	limited	
number	of	organisations	having	the	financial	
capacity	and	depth	of	skills	and	resources	available	
to	compete	for	the	likely	size	of	works	packages.	To	
achieve	value	for	money,	governments	would	need	
to	carefully	package	and	stage	the	procurement	
to	ensure	competitive	bids	were	achieved	for	
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each	package.	Government	would	need	to	retain	
some	of	the	risks	around	the	integration	of	
the	component	parts,	but	these	risks	could	be	
mitigated	through	rigorous	technical	oversight.	
Governments	would	retain	an	ongoing	role	in	the	
stewardship	of	the	HSR	sector	after	construction,	
to	ensure	the	objectives	and	economic	benefits	
of	the	HSR	program	were	achieved.	This	role	
would	involve	providing	oversight	of	the	delivery	
of	HSR	services	against	agreed	price	and	service	
quality	metrics,	while	being	careful	to	avoid	
constraining	the	market	agility	and	innovation	
of	those	managing	the	transport	services.	
Governments	would	also	be	responsible	for	safety	
and	environmental	compliance.	
The	private	sector	should	be	closely	involved	in	a	
broad	range	of	roles:
•	 Design	and	construction	of	components	of	the	
HSR	infrastructure	network	under	contract		
to	governments.
•	 Development	of	station	precincts	in	partnership	
with	the	relevant	government.
•	 Supply	of	rolling	stock	(train	sets)	and	the	
signalling	and	communications	systems.
•	 Control	and	operation	of	HSR	trains	to	deliver	
high	standard	transport	services	to	the	public.
•	 Maintenance	of	the	HSR	system.
Development	of	HSR	stations,	and	associated	
commercial	opportunities,	would	offer	an	
opportunity	for	private	finance.	A	public-private	
partnership	model	is	envisaged	for	greenfield	
station	developments,	with	the	private	sector	
partnering	with	the	relevant	state	or	territory	
government	for	CBD	station	developments.
Under	the	preferred	model,	HSR	train	services	
would	be	contracted	to	a	private	sector	operator	
through	one	or	more	concession	arrangements.	
There	would	be	separate	concessions	for		
Line	1	and	Line	2,	each	being	a	combined	
exclusive	concession	for	inter-capital	express	and	
regional	services	on	that	route,	although	a	single	
operator	would	not	necessarily	be	precluded	
from	operating	both	concessions.	The	concession	
holder(s)	would	operate	the	train	services,	control	
the	movement	of	trains	through	the	network	and	
maintain	the	HSR	network.	
The	preferred	model	for	Australia	has	common	
elements	with	many	of	the	world’s	HSR	lines,	
although	overall	it	is	perhaps	closest	to	the	
Japanese	model	for	new	HSR	lines.	In	Japan,	a	
single	state-owned	entity	(JRTT)	is	responsible	
for	the	development	and	strategic	management	of	
the	HSR	network,	but	operation	of	train	services,	
control	of	the	movement	of	trains	and	maintenance	
of	lines	is	carried	out	by	(mainly)	private	sector	
train	operating	companies	serving	particular	high	
speed	routes	on	an	exclusive	basis,	for	which	they	
pay	JRTT	a	fee	for	use	of	the	line.
Delivering the public sector components 
of a future HSR program
If	adopted,	a	future	HSR	program	would	be	
developed	in	discrete	phases,	starting	with	initial	
feasibility	studies	and	investigations,	leading	
on	to	construction	and	operation	of	the	HSR	
system.	Four	separate	phases	can	be	identified,	as	
illustrated	in	Figure ES-18.	
    Executive Summary 
Figure	ES-18	 Four	phases	of	the	HSR	program
1
Preparation & 
corridor protection
2
Detailed planning 
& procurement
3
Construction
4
Operation
Figure  ES-19
The	first	phase	in	a	future	HSR	program	would	
be	a	preparation	and	corridor	protection	phase,	
which	would	precede	a	formal	commitment	
to	build	the	HSR	system.	This	phase	would	
provide	the	necessary	policy	foundation	for	the	
procurement,	construction	and	operation	of	a	
future	HSR	program.	It	would	require	alignment	
between	the	participating	governments	on	the	
program	objectives,	mechanisms	and	timeframes	
for	resolving	issues,	and	the	delivery	of	enabling	
regulation	or	legislation.	
The	proposed	model	for	pursuing	multi-
jurisdictional	agreements	of	the	type	needed	to	
support	the	HSR	program	is	to	adopt	a	‘gated	
approach’	using	a	series	of	formal	agreements.	
Each	formal	agreement	in	the	process	would	need	
to	be	in	place	prior	to	progressing	to	the	next	stage,	
ensuring	alignment	of	governments	at	critical	
milestones.	The	first	gate	would	be	a	Memorandum	
of	Understanding	(MoU)	between	the	Australian,	
ACT	and	state	governments	to	formalise	the	
engagement	on	the	HSR	program	and	to	set	out	
the	responsibilities	of	the	parties,	the	process	
to	be	followed	and	the	timelines	for	resolving	
issues.	Subsequent	gates	would	involve	formal	
inter-governmental	agreements	(IGAs),	first	to	
protect	an	HSR	corridor	and	later	to	develop	and	
implement	a	stage	or	stages	of	HSR.	
Once	there	is	a	mandate	to	implement	a	preferred	
HSR	system,	a	publicly-owned	HSR	development	
authority	(HSRDA)	would	be	created	to	develop,	
procure	and	integrate	the	HSR	system,	including	
procuring	and	owning	the	required	land.	A	
single	coordinating	authority,	with	appropriate	
professional	management	expertise,	would	be	
required	to	effectively	and	efficiently	progress	the	
detailed	planning	required	to	develop	and	procure	
an	HSR	system	(the	HSRDA	would	later	evolve	
into	an	HSR	development	and	management	
authority	in	the	operational	phase,	and	would	
prepare	and	manage	train	operations	concessions).	
The	HSRDA	could	be	owned	jointly	by	the	
Australian	Government,	ACT	Government	and	
relevant	state	governments.	
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Next steps
If	it	were	decided	that	the	case	for	HSR	on	the	east	
coast	of	Australia	has	sufficient	merit	for	further	
government	action	to	be	taken,	there	are	a	number	
of	immediate	next	steps	in	the	process	that	could	
lead	to	a	decision	to	protect	the	HSR	corridor	and	
possibly	to	a	decision	to	implement	HSR.
The	immediate	next	step	following	completion	
of	the	HSR	study	is	to	confirm	the	Australian	
government’s	interest	in	continuing	the	necessary	
preparatory	works	to	inform	a	formal	ministerial	
decision	to	proceed.	
Following	a	decision	to	proceed,	an	MoU	would	
be	signed	to	allow	planning	and	development	
work,	including	corridor	protection,	to	commence.	
Governments	would	need	to	commit	resources	and	
funding	to	the	development	and	delivery	of	the	
arrangements	under	the	MoU.	
The	MoU	would	initiate	a	number	of	activities,	
including	site	investigations	necessary	for	corridor	
protection	and	preparation	of	the	IGA	to	protect	
the	HSR	corridor.	The	aim	of	the	IGA	would	be	to	
formalise	the	commitment	to	the	protection	of	the	
HSR	corridor	by	rezoning,	resuming,	purchasing	
or	holding	land	within	the	corridor.	



